Candidate Strategy and Assessment During Election Campaigns by Banda, Kevin K.
CANDIDATE STRATEGY AND ASSESSMENT DURING ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS
Kevin K. Banda
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Political Science.
Chapel Hill
2013
Approved by:
Thomas M. Carsey
Pamela J. Conover
Virginia H. Gray
Michael B. MacKuen
James A. Stimson
c© 2013
Kevin K. Banda
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii
ABSTRACT
KEVIN K. BANDA: Candidate Strategy and Assessment During Election Campaigns.
(Under the direction of Thomas M. Carsey)
I examine the formation and consequences of candidates’ issue agendas — the issues on
which they focus during election campaigns. I argue that candidates’ issue-based messages
are important for three reasons. First, the issues candidates discuss should affect the issues
that their opponents talk about. Second, the issues candidates discuss and the positions they
outline in their messages should influence citizens’ views of the candidates’ ideological and
issue positions. Last, the ideological portrayal of candidates’ opponents as communicated
through a negative message should have two effects: it should (1) alter citizens’ views of
the target of the attack in the way suggested by the message and (2) lead citizens to view
the sponsor of the attack as holding characteristics that are the opposite of their portrayal
of their opponent. I use data from 146 U.S. Senate and gubernatorial campaigns to assess
my first argument and data drawn from two survey experiments to address the second and
third arguments. The results of my analyses offer strong support for my theories.
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1 THE DYNAMICS OF CAMPAIGN ISSUE AGENDAS
Candidates and their campaign staffs expend a great deal of effort attempting to shape
the information environment voters face when choosing a candidate to support. Candidates
want to set the agendas of their campaigns in ways that will maximize their chances of win-
ning elections. One of the ways they might be able to exert agenda control is by focusing
on issues that favor them and harm their opponents. While this approach is straightforward,
several studies have shown that competing candidates often talk about the same issues even
when one candidate holds an advantage relative to her opponent (e.g. Sigelman and Buell
2004; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Sides 2006). What drives candidates to discuss the
same sets of issues during campaigns?
I argue that the way in which candidates shape their issue agendas — the sets of related
issues they discuss during campaigns — is informed by two factors: the issue agendas of
their opponents and the competitiveness of the election environment they face. Candidates
must obtain the support of the median voter in order to win elections. One of the ways
they may attempt to do so is by responding to their opponents’ issue agendas by devoting
more of their own campaign’s focus to those same sets of issues, or converging in terms of
issue agendas.1 Doing so may help candidates appeal to the median voter by, for example,
broadening their perceived degree of expertise across a wider array of issues.
In addition, some scholars argue that the proclivity of candidates to respond to one
another is conditioned by the competitiveness of their elections (e.g. Kaplan, Park, and
Ridout 2006). Non-habitual voters are more likely to participate in competitive elections,
1By “converging,” I do not mean that candidates will increasingly take similar positions, merely that they
will discuss the same sets of issues.
so candidates in competitive races may face additional pressure to address one another’s
issue agendas in order to appeal to occasional voters, who tend to be more persuadable
than habitual voters.
I test these propositions using advertising data collected by the Wisconsin Advertising
Project from 146 statewide campaigns — 92 of which were for U.S. Senate seats and 54
of which were for governorships — occurring during six election years across all 50 states.
I use a dynamic modeling technique to test my theory and find strong evidence of issue
agenda convergence in both noncompetitive and competitive campaigns, but a generally
higher level in the latter. In other words, candidates respond to the issue agendas of their
opponents and do so to a greater extent in competitive elections. These findings lead to
important implications for our understanding of campaign dynamics, candidate strategy,
and the importance of issues in statewide contests.
1.1 Campaigns, Candidates, and Issues
The principal finding of most contemporary research on campaigns and elections is
that campaigns matter in fundamental ways that can shape election outcomes (see for ex-
ample Carsey 2000; Stimson 2004; Brady, Johnston, and Sides 2006; Vavreck 2009). While
there is evidence that electoral decisions at the system level are influenced by campaigns
(Wlezien and Erikson 2002), there is less evidence that campaigns can persuade individual
citizens to change their vote choices (but see Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996; Hillygus
and Shields 2008). One way that candidates may seek to influence citizens is by altering
their campaign messages in an attempt to change the criteria citizens use when they evaluate
candidates, a process known as heresthetic change (Riker 1990). Candidates may try to use
their campaigns to induce these changes in a number of ways: they may attempt to stimu-
late underlying predispositions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), produce a sense
of “enlightenment” about the state of the country among citizens (Gelman and King 1993),
or act as a priming mechanism (Bartels 2006, but see Lenz 2009). Campaigns also alter the
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level of ambiguity in politics by reducing citizens’ feelings of uncertainty about political
candidates (Franklin 1991; Alvarez 1997; Peterson 2004, 2009). In addition, candidates
may also attempt to change which issues the public finds most salient (Carsey 2000). Sim-
ilarly, coverage of campaigns by the news media can affect the perceived importance of
issues (Kinder 1998a,b; Iyengar and Simon 2000).
How then might candidates seek to win over potential voters during election cam-
paigns? Candidates could use one of three broad strategies when attempting to win an
election (e.g. Carsey 2000). The first broad strategy involves trying to change their po-
sitions on various issues so that their stated preferences are congruent with those of the
median voter. While this is a sensible strategy in the abstract, it is problematic for at least
three reasons. First, candidates may alienate their party’s activists by attempting to appeal
to moderates. This is a potentially dangerous strategy because activists tend to hold more
extreme policy preferences than other citizens and may sit out an election if they do not
feel as if their interests are being represented (Wittman 1983; Miller and Jennings 1986;
Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Second, candidates may have well established records
which might be difficult to escape because their opponents and the news media will likely
discuss the weaknesses in candidates’ records. Finally, it may be difficult for candidates
to change their positions on issues because people are motivated reasoners and are likely
to respond to incongruent information about candidates by arguing against and discarding
it (Kunda 1990). Information that confirms previously held beliefs is also unlikely to alter
attitudes but is likely to be evaluated more positively than comparable incongruent infor-
mation (Taber and Lodge 2006). While candidates may attempt to improve their standing
among their opponents’ partisans, they may find it quite difficult to do so because these par-
tisans are already predisposed to dislike the candidates and may disregard messages sug-
gesting that they hold positions on some issues that are congruent with their non-preferred
candidates.
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The second broad campaign strategy available to candidates is to try to persuade citi-
zens to change their minds about one or more issues in ways that favor the candidate. Like
changing one’s positions, persuading citizens is also a daunting task. Candidates have little
reason to try to persuade their own supporters and those of their opponent are predisposed
to dislike them due to biased information processing brought on by partisanship. Trying
to convince citizens that their current attitudes are incorrect is difficult to accomplish, es-
pecially given that to do so, citizens must admit that their previous attitude was incorrect
(Riker 1990).
Because many candidates may find it difficult to change their positions or persuade large
numbers of citizens, they may instead pursue a third strategy, that of heresthetic change,
in which they attempt to affect the conditions under which citizens make their choices by
altering the salience of issues in the electoral environment (Riker 1990). Carsey (2000)
argues that candidates focus on the issues that advantage them the most relative to their
opponents while avoiding those for which their position is less advantageous. By spending
a great deal of time talking about the issues on which they are most advantaged, candidates
hope to induce citizens to think about their vote choices in a manner that favors them.
1.1.1 Issue Selection
Much of the extant research on issues in campaigns suggests that candidates should try
to focus on the issues that advantage them. There are several potential sources of candidate
advantage on issues. First, candidates’ records and personal characteristics appear to play
important roles in determining whether or not a candidate has an advantage on an issue
(Sellers 1998; Brasher 2003). Sellers (1998) and Damore (2004), for example, find that
candidates who hold popular positions on issues are advantaged relative to their opponents.
A second source of advantage stems from the issue ownership literature, which suggests
that the Democratic and Republican parties each “own” a set of issues; they are advantaged
4
on these issues because citizens on average believe that they are better able to handle prob-
lems related to these issues than are members of the opposing party (Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1994; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003; Egan Forthcoming).
These studies and others (see for example Budge and Farlie 1983; Carsey 2000) suggest
that candidates should mostly focus on different sets of issues and should, for the most part,
avoid engaging the same issues on which their opponents focus.2 Simon (2002) suggests
that candidates should never discuss the same issues as one another, even in competitive
campaigns when they may face pressure to do so. The logic underlying this argument
is that candidates have little to gain from discussing issues on which their opponents are
advantaged because doing so will likely remind citizens that the candidates’ opponents are
more desirable on some dimensions. In other words, candidates can only harm themselves
by addressing their opponents’ issues.
The results presented by scholars of issue convergence, however, suggest that candi-
dates routinely discuss many of the same issues that their opponents talk about during elec-
tion campaigns (Sigelman and Buell 2004; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Sides 2006,
2007). “Issue convergence” in this literature refers to the process in which candidates in-
crease the degree to which they discuss an issue in response to increases in their opponents’
focus on the same issue. It is about issue emphasis, not issue positions. There is also some
evidence suggesting that candidates diverge — discuss different issues — from one an-
other. Spiliotes and Vavreck (2002), for example, observe divergence among candidates
from different parties within districts and states. They do, however, observe convergence
among copartisans.
While the issue convergence literature focuses on individual issues, I focus on bundles
2This notion is a bit of a simplification because Petrocik (1996) predicts some degree of dialogue between
candidates during campaigns, but he expects this to occur mostly on performance issues such as the state of
the national economy and national security. Performance issues are fundamentally different than party-owned
issues because issue advantage on the former is fleeting while advantage on the latter is temporally stable.
Valence is also central to performance issues; few would argue that a strong national economy and effective
national security are superfluous.
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of related issues — issue agendas — in this research. The issues that make up a given issue
agenda may be related in a number of ways. First, the issues may be related to one another
in that they are all part of a single broader issue category. For example, medical insurance
for children, Medicare, and hospice services could all be viewed more broadly as being
directly related to health care policy. A second type of issue agenda is broader still; issues
relating to health care, education, and poverty programs are also similar to one another in
that they are all social policies.3 A third potential form that issue agendas might take are
through the relationships between issues and parties, i.e. issue ownership (Petrocik 1996;
Egan Forthcoming). Given the strong ties between the bundles of issues that make up an
issue agenda, candidates should not only respond to their opponents on individual issues
as has been observed in the issue convergence literature, but also across groups of related
issues that make up issue agendas.
1.1.2 Issue Agendas
There are several reasons to expect candidates’ issue agendas to converge over the
course of a campaign. First, parties should try to reduce the support for their opponents
by making overtures towards members of opposing coalitions (Downs 1957) and may do
so by focusing on wedge issues (Miller and Schofield 2003; Hillygus and Shields 2008).
Second, candidates who discuss their opponents’ issues may do so by reframing the issue
in a way to emphasize the strengths of the candidate or her party (Sides 2006). 4 Holian
(2004) provides a clear example on the Republican-owned issue of crime. Republicans
3Other examples of broad policy categories that can represent issue agendas are morality policies, eco-
nomic policies, and foreign policies.
4Jerit (2008) shows that another reason to expect to observe some degree of issue agenda convergence is
because providing a counterargument is more persuasive for citizens than reframing an argument or issue.
Jerit’s research focuses on a political debate that occurred between rather than during an election campaign,
but the logic of this argument also fits into a campaigns framework. A candidate’s opponent could, for
example, discuss their support of additional expenditures on education in terms of leveling the playing field
for children in less wealthy areas. Rather than reframing the issue to focus on the costs of the additional
spending, the candidate may be better off arguing that additional expenditures will not improve educational
outcomes.
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historically discussed crime in terms of punishment. When then Governor Clinton “stole”
crime during his 1992 campaign for the Presidency, he did so by reframing the issue in
terms of crime prevention, a dimension on which he was advantaged relative to his oppo-
nent. Third, candidates may also respond to their opponents’ attacks in order to defend their
records and positions (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995; Theilmann and Wilhite 1998; Lau
and Pomper 2004). Fourth, candidates may be more likely to discuss issues that are more
salient, which would lead candidates to discuss the same sets of issues even if they were not
attempting to directly respond to their opponents (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Last,
salient elections generate more information for citizens to consider when choosing among
candidates (Franklin 1991; Kahn and Kenney 1999) and citizens tend to use information
about issues and ideology in addition to partisan cues in these kinds of elections (Basinger
and Lavine 2005). More generally, engaging a larger set of issues also allows candidates
to provide citizens with more information about their candidacies (Geer 2006; Franz and
Ridout 2007).
Party-owned Issue Agendas
I focus more specifically in this research on issues that are owned by one of the two
major U.S. parties, i.e. the candidates’ party-owned issue agendas. I concentrate on
party-owned issue agendas rather than individual issues or other kinds of issue agendas be-
cause citizens associate candidates with the party that owns the issues they discuss (Banda
2010) and tend tend to associate specific issues with individual parties (Walgrave, Lefe-
vere, and Tresch 2012). For example, citizens who are exposed to a candidate’s discussion
of Republican-owned (Democratic-owned) issues tend to link that candidate more strongly
with the Republican (Democratic) Party when forming attitudes about the candidate’s ide-
ological and issue positions. Thus, if citizens form attitudes about candidates in response
to the party ownership of the issues those candidates discuss, then candidates may respond
to their opponents’ party-owned issue agendas by discussing issues owned by the same
party. A candidate could, for example, respond to her opponent’s discussion of a set of
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Republican-owned issues by discussing the same or other Republican-owned issues. Party-
owned issues are related to one another because citizens bundle them together and this
allows citizens to evaluate candidates on the same dimensions even when they discuss dif-
ferent — but related through party ownership — issues. Candidates, then, can communicate
consistent signals to citizens across many related issues simultaneously rather than issue by
issue.
I argue — contrary to strict proponents heresthetic change — that candidates should
respond to one another’s party-owned issue agendas by converging. In other words, candi-
dates should alter the degree to which they discuss Democratic or Republican-owned issues
as their opponent alters their own attention to these sets of issues. Stated more formally:
H1: The level of attention devoted to a set of party-owned issues by a candidate
will increase as her opponent’s attention to the same set of party-owned issues
increases.
Issue ownership does not speak to candidate behavior on all issues, merely to those
owned by a party. This is therefore a conservative test of issue agenda convergence be-
cause candidates on average are disadvantaged on the issues that are owned by the parties
of their opponents. This disadvantage should lead candidates who do not own a set of is-
sues to be less likely to discuss them. Put another way, it should be easier to observe issue
agenda convergence on issues that are not owned by parties relative to party-owned issues
because the former do not contain inherent advantages and disadvantages due to the coun-
tervailing influence of party ownership which should discourage issue agenda convergence.
Additionally, because citizens bundle party-owned issues together, it is useful to observe
the extent to which candidates (1) do so as well and (2) alter their strategies in response to
their opponents’ strategies.5
5Scholars could also examine strategic interactions between competing candidates on other sets of related
issues. For example, citizens and candidates may bundle economic issues together. These issues do not,
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1.1.3 Electoral Competition
The extant literature suggests that the issue agendas of candidates will reflect one an-
other to a greater extent when the campaign environment is competitive (Kaplan, Park, and
Ridout 2006). Citizens may find competitive campaigns more interesting to follow because
the outcome is not so obvious before Election Day. Citizens who are faced with a noncom-
petitive campaign may be more likely to ignore political information because they view it
as both uninteresting — because the contest is fairly one sided — and irrelevant — because
the outcome of the election is not in doubt. Competitive campaigns may stimulate citizens
to become more interested in the campaigns, which may in turn lead them to want to learn
more about the candidates and their views. Thus, the additional interest that competitive
campaigns produce among citizens may lead candidates to feel compelled to respond to
their opponents’ party-owned issue agendas to teach citizens about themselves and their
opponents.
Kahn and Kenney (2004) found that competitive campaigns tend to be more negative
than those that are noncompetitive, in large part because frontrunners will bother to spend
time attacking their opponents in these contests. Competitiveness is key here for front-
running candidates because they only have an incentive to respond to their opponent’s
attacks when electoral conditions do not overwhelmingly favor them. More generally, when
a candidate is attacked, they may feel compelled to respond by either defending themselves
or by attacking their opponent on the same or a similar issue.
The news media should also be more interested in competitive campaigns for at least
two reasons. First, competitive elections produce information that can be easily framed into
a provocative narrative about an important political conflict. These narratives can then be
however, consistently advantage one kind of candidate over another, so a test of issue agenda convergence on
economic issues may be an easier than a test involving party-owned issues.
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communicated to citizens who will be more receptive to consuming stories about compet-
itive elections than they will stories following lopsided contests, which do not lend them-
selves to being repackaged as compelling narratives. The second reason is that journalists
may not view noncompetitive elections as being particularly newsworthy. For this reason,
they may be less likely to devote scarce resources to covering noncompetitive contests.
Candidates are cognizant of the level of coverage the news media devotes to their cam-
paigns and may feel pressured to respond to their opponents’ party-owned issue agendas in
response to the additional coverage in order to avoid criticism.
Consistent with the work of other scholars (Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006), I argue that
as competition increases, so too should the likelihood that candidates’ own strategies are
informed by those of their opponents. In other words, candidates should converge on issue
agendas to a greater extent in competitive elections than they should in noncompetitive
elections. This potentially conditional relationship leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: The issue agenda convergence predicted in H1 should be more pronounced
in competitive campaigns than in noncompetitive campaigns.
If strict proponents of heresthetic change are correct, candidates will not respond to
their opponents’ party-owned issue agendas in competitive or noncompetitive elections
because they will not want to engage in discourse about issues on which they are viewed
as being weak.
1.2 The Dynamics of Campaign Advertising and Party-Owned Issues
I propose a dynamic test of issue agenda convergence in which I model Candidate A’s
issue agenda as a function of their own issue agenda in the previous time period along with
Candidate B’s issue agenda in the previous time period. This modeling strategy allows
for a direct test of campaign dialogue; if candidates respond to one another by engaging
in dialogue, they will increase their attention to their opponents’ previous agendas. If
candidates talk past each other, there will be no evidence that they respond to one another’s
10
party-owned issue agendas.
I examine the attention given by candidates to party-owned issues expressed through
television advertisements for three reasons. First, television advertising is ubiquitous in
statewide and national campaigns and is increasingly prevalent as the competitiveness of
a campaign increases. Second, studying television advertising allows me to bypass the
the news media’s filter that would be present in an analysis using newspaper coverage
of campaigns. The advertisements run by candidates should reflect the candidates’ overall
campaign strategies because the advertising messages do not have to pass through the filters
of external actors. Third, candidates may change their strategies over the course of their
campaigns. Advertising data allows me to observe these changes dynamically.
I analyze U.S. Senate and gubernatorial campaigns for two reasons. First, I argue that
candidate strategy may differ based on whether or not an election is competitive. There
is little variation in presidential election competitiveness; they are all competitive, at least
at the national level.6 I therefore need contests for which there are both competitive and
noncompetitive contexts. Statewide elections like U.S. Senate and gubernatorial contests
fit this requirement. Second, candidates for statewide offices rely on advertising to com-
municate with citizens to a greater extent than do candidates running for the U.S. House
and for offices further down the ticket.
6There is much more variance in the competitiveness of presidential elections at the state level.
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1.3 Research Design
I make use of the Wisconsin Advertising Project’s (WiscAds) 1998 through 20087 U.S.
Senate and gubernatorial advertising data sets to test my theory.8 These data contain in-
formation on the date, time, and television station on which each political advertisement
ran in the 75 largest media markets in 1998, the 100 largest U.S. media markets from 2000
through 2004, and all U.S. media markets in 2008. I use all U.S. Senate and gubernatorial
contests in which both major parties were represented by a candidate9 and in which both
candidates ran general election television advertisements.10 Candidates who were sacri-
ficial lambs were thus excluded from my analysis. This left me with 146 contests — 92
Senate and 54 gubernatorial races — spread across six election years and all 50 states.
Given these constraints, advertisements aired in 161 media markets are included in my
analysis. Table 1.1 lists the contests observed in this research.
Each advertisement airing was coded by members of the WiscAds teams for a large
number of characteristics, the most important of which for this research are the issues
discussed in the ads. Coders included up to four issues per advertisement and about 50
issues were included in the coding scheme.11 Some of these issues were transitory in nature,
but many were included in every year of the data. I coded 31 of these issues as being owned
7The years included are 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2008. The 1998 data only contains U.S.
Senate ads and the 2003 data covers two gubernatorial campaigns.
8The data were obtained from a project of the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project includes media
tracking data from TNSMI/Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington, D.C. The University of Wiscon-
sin Advertising Project was sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts. The opinions expressed
in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Wisconsin
Advertising Project or The Pew Charitable Trusts.
9I treated Paul Wellstone and Walter Mondale as a single candidate in Minnesota’s 2002 Senate race due
to the former’s death late in the campaign. Excluding the race from my analysis does not alter the substantive
findings I report in this research.
10I excluded contests in which one candidate ran only a trivial number of advertisements or only ran ads
in a single week. Excluded elections include New Mexico’s 2000 Senate race and New Hampshire’s 2004
Senate contest. The losing candidates in these elections aired fewer than 10 advertisements during their
campaigns.
11Most advertisements were coded as mentioning only a single issue.
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Table 1.1: U.S. Senate and Gubernatorial Election Con-
tests Included in These Data
1998
AR, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN
KY, MD, MO, NC, NV, NY, OH, OR
SC, WA, WI
2000
CA, DE†, FL, GA, IN†, MD, ME, MI
MN, MO†, NC∗, NE, NH∗, NJ, NV, NY
PA, RI, UT†, VA, WA†, WV∗
2002
AL†, AR†, AZ∗, CA∗, CO†, CT∗, FL∗, GA†
HI∗, IA†, ID, IL∗, KS∗, KY, MA∗, MD∗
ME†, MI∗, MN†, MO, NC, NH†, NJ, NM†
NY∗, OK†, OR†, PA∗, RI∗, SC†, TN†, TX†
VT∗, WI∗
2003 KY∗, MS∗
2004
CO, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN∗, KY
MD, MO†, NC†, NH∗, OK, PA, SC, UT∗
VT†, WA†, WI
2008
AK, CO, GA, ID, IN∗, KS, KY, LA
MA, ME, MN, MO∗, MS], MT∗, NC†, ND∗
NE, NH†, NM, OK, OR, SD, TX, VT∗
WA∗
∗ Gubernatorial election.
† Senate and gubernatorial elections.
] Two Senate elections; one regularly scheduled and
one special election.
by either the Republicans or the Democrats, each of which is listed in Table 1.2. I selected
these issues because they fit Petrocik’s (Petrocik 1996) established descriptions of party-
owned issues (see also Egan Forthcoming). These are issues for which the parties have
long-standing advantages rather than issues that temporarily advantage one party or the
other.12
12There is some scholarly debate about whether or not crime continues to be a Republica-owned issue.
Sides (2006), for example, reports evidence suggesting that the Republican advantage on crime had largely
disappeared by 1998. Egan (Forthcoming), on the other hand, finds that Republicans maintained their long
term advantage on crime through 2008 and further finds a great deal of stability in party ownership of issues
more generally.
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Table 1.2: Coding Scheme: Issue Ownership
Democratic Republican
Minimum wage Taxes
Farming (friend of) Government spending
Union (friend of) Business (friend of)
Affirmative action Capital punishment/Death penalty
Civil liberties/privacy Moral/family/religious
Education/schools Immigration
Health care Terrorism
Child care Assisted suicide
Other child related issues Creationism
Social Security Crime
Medicare Narcotics/drugs
Welfare Gun control
Prescription drugs Defense/military
Women’s health Missile defense
Environment Veterans
Civil rights
Next, I collapsed these advertising data by contest and media market and created weekly
time series. In each observation I recorded the number of advertisements that week that
mentioned at least one Democratic or Republican-owned issue.13 The number of advertise-
ments in a week that contained Democratic and Republican-owned issues for each of the
candidates serve as the dependent variables in my analysis. They are also key independent
variables in some of my models, as the attention given to them by a candidate’s opponent
should affect the former’s issue agenda.
13While I opted to include crime as a Republican-owned issue, this decision did not affect the substance of
my findings. Measures of the candidates’ weekly Republican-owned issue agendas including and precluding
crime correlate with one another at very high levels — about 0.97 — for both Democratic and Republican
candidates. Additionally, I also created measures of candidates weekly Democratic-owned issue agendas for
which I excluded mentions of Social Security and Medicare. I did so because a large proportion of advertise-
ments mentioning Democratic-owned issues involved these two issues. These new measures correlated with
the old measures at .9 or higher for both Democratic and Republican candidates. The results of models using
these new measures generated substantively identical results to those that I present.
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1.3.1 Contest and Candidate Level Characteristics
I use the Cook Political Report’s race ratings as an indicator of electoral competition. In
its raw form, the ratings are a seven point measure for which competitiveness is strongest in
the middle categories. Its seven values are “solid Democratic,” “likely Democratic,” “lean
Democratic,” “toss up,” “lean Republican,” “likely Republican,” and “solid Republican.” I
collapsed this scale down to a simple dichotomous indicator of competition; contests coded
as “leaning” or “toss up” were coded as being competitive (1) while the rest were coded as
noncompetitive races (0).
I include dichotomous indicators of whether or not each candidate is an incumbent —
because incumbents may be less apt to discuss party owned issues due to their electoral
security — or a woman — because female candidates may be more likely to emphasize
women’s issues (Windett 2011), which also tend to be associated with the Democratic
Party — along with dummy variables indicating whether or not the contest was an open
seat election and whether or not the election occurred in each election year. I include
these latter two indicators to account for potential differences in candidate strategy in open
seat elections and in each of the years for which I have data. I also include dichotomous
indicators for whether or not each candidate is black and Latino. These indicators allow me
to control for potential differences in campaign strategy driven by race, as candidates who
are racial minorities may be more likely to spend time talking about racial issues, which
are owned by the Democratic Party.
Approximately 36% of elections were open seat contests and just under 59% of the elec-
tions were competitive. Thirty percent of contests involved at least one female candidate
while three and two percent contained at least one black or Latino candidate respectively.
Thirty seven percent of the elections were for governorships. Table 1.3 contains summary
statistics for each of the variables included in my analysis.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics at the Weekly Media Market Level
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max.
Democratic candidates
# Democratic-owned ads 64.1 87.5 0 706
# Republican-owned ads 44.3 74.1 0 599
Republican candidates
# Democratic-owned ads 54.6 79.7 0 792
# Republican-owned ads 58.4 86.7 0 663
Contest-level characteristics
Open seat 0.329 0.470 0 1
Gubernatorial election 0.404 0.491 0 1
Candidate is an incumbent
Democrats 0.239 0.426 0 1
Republicans 0.431 0.495 0 1
Candidate is female
Democrats 0.257 0.437 0 1
Republicans 0.042 0.200 0 1
Candidate is black
Democrats 0.028 0.164 0 1
Republicans 0.014 0.116 0 1
Candidate is Latino/a
Democrats 0.031 0.174 0 1
Republicans 0.009 0.095 0 1
Year indicators
2000 0.146 0.353 0 1
2002 0.329 0.470 0 1
2003 0.014 0.116 0 1
2004 0.228 0.420 0 1
2008 0.287 0.452 0 1
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1.3.2 Modeling Campaigns as Dynamic Processes
I use pooled time series data in order to capture campaign dynamics. Because my theory
predicts interaction between candidates and the behavior I want to model occurs simultane-
ously, I must control for possible simultaneous and unmodeled correlation in the behavior
of the candidates.14 I do so using seemingly unrelated regression, which allows for multiple
equations and for the error terms of each equation be contemporaneously correlated with
one another (see Carsey, Jackson, Stewart, and Nelson 2011 for a similar application).
I employ an error correction modeling framework, which allows me to calculate long
and short term effects of time serial covariates on my dependent variables in my analysis
and is appropriate for both stationary and nonstationary data (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
The dependent variable of an error correction model is the first difference of the dependent
variable rather than the value at time t. This framework also requires the inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable, the coefficient of which estimates the rate of error correction,
and both first differences and lagged levels of the remaining endogenous covariates.15
I estimate four equations simultaneously which predict the Democratic candidate’s
weekly number of advertisements containing (1) Democratic-owned issues, (2) Republican-
owned issues and the Republican candidate’s weekly number of advertisements containing
(3) Democratic-owned issues, and (4) Republican-owned issues. The equations follow:
∆DDit =a1DDit−1 + b1RDit−1 + c1∆RDit + (d1RDit−1 ∗ Comp) + (e1∆RDit ∗ Comp) + j1Comp
+ kqControl + µ1
(1.1)
14Failing to do so would lead me to violate the assumption that my data are independently and identically
distributed, which can lead to insurmountable problems when trying to interpret statistical results.
15I tested for unit roots using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and for autocorrelation using Woolridge
(2002) tests panel data in each of my dependent variables. The results of these tests suggested that these
variables do not contain unit roots and that first-order autocorrelation is present in the data.
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∆DRit =a2DRit−1 + b2RRit−1 + c2∆RRit + (d2RRit−1 ∗ Comp) + (e2∆RRit ∗ Comp) + j2Comp
+ kqControl + µ2
(1.2)
∆RDit =a3RDit−1 + b3DDit−1 + c3∆DDit + (d3DDit−1 ∗ Comp) + (e3∆DDit ∗ Comp) + j3Comp
+ kqControl + µ3
(1.3)
∆RRit =a4RRit−1 + b4DRit−1 + c4∆DRit + (d4DRit−1 ∗ Comp) + (e4∆DRit ∗ Comp) + j4Comp
+ kqControl + µ4
(1.4)
In the preceding equations, each of the two letter long variables stands for one of the
issue agenda covariates. The first letter refers to the party of the advertising candidate
while the second refers to the party that owns the set of issues that were discussed in
the candidates’ advertisements that week. “DDit,” for example, refers to the Democratic
candidate’s emphasis of Democratic-owned issues while “RDit” refers to the Republican
candidate’s emphasis of Democratic-owned issues in media market i and at time t. “Comp”
refers to the dichotomous competition indicator. “Control” is a vector of control variables
including whether or not the contest is for an open seat, a governorship, and the candidate
is a woman, an incumbent, black, or Latino. I also included a series of dummies indicating
the year in which the campaign took place.
The coefficients of the differenced covariates represent the average short term, or con-
temporaneous, change in the dependent variable that results from a one unit increase in the
covariate. The contemporaneous changes occur at time t. The coefficients of the lagged
covariates correspond to a second short term effect, this time at time t + 1. These effects
at time t + 1 are not necessarily theoretically interesting on their own, but when they are
divided by the negative of the coefficient generated for the lagged dependent variable, they
represent what is called the long run multiplier (LRM), which captures the total short and
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long run change in the dependent variable over future time periods given a one unit increase
of the associated covariate.16
The theory I have outlined in this paper is agnostic as to whether candidates will respond
to one another immediately or in the future. I will therefore focus on the total effects of
each of the endogenous covariates of interest each dependent variable. In other words, I
will focus on the long run multipliers.
1.3.3 Expectations
I expect that candidates will alter their issue agendas in response to those of their op-
ponents. Candidates should increase the number of advertisements mentioning a set of
party-owned issues as their opponents air more advertisements mentioning the same set of
party-owned issues. In other words, I expect that coefficients bn, cn, dn, en, and their asso-
ciated long run multipliers will be positive and significantly (p ≤ .05) different than zero.
Should these expectations be met, these results would offer support for my agenda con-
vergence theory rather than the various theories discussed above that predict non-response
among competing candidates.
1.4 Results
Before I report the results of my seemingly unrelated regression model, I first present
two brief examples of my data. Figure 1.1 contains four panels plotting the number of
advertisements mentioning Democratic and Republican-owned issues in the 2002 Texas
gubernatorial race and the 2004 North Carolina Senate campaign. In the case of the Texas
contest, the data are from the Houston media market while the North Carolina data are
from the Raleigh-Durham media market. The general pattern of these data suggests that
candidates’ party-owned issue agendas shift in response to one another. When one candi-
date increases or decreases their attention to Democratic or Republican-owned issues, so
too does the their opponent. The following analysis is an effort to determine whether this
16I calculate the standard errors of each long run multiplier using the Bewley (1979) transformation (see
also DeBoef and Keele 2008).
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pattern is consistent across a large number of races.
1.4.1 Candidate Interaction and Party-Owned Issue Agendas
Table 1.4 contains the results of a four-equation seemingly unrelated regression model.17
The first two columns of results are for equations estimating the extent to which Democratic
candidates emphasized Democratic and Republican-owned issues. Columns three and four
show the same for Republican candidates.
Error correction models produce output that can be difficult to interpret directly. The
model presented in Table 1.4 is further complicated by the presence of interaction terms.
Rather than focusing on individual coefficients, I will instead focus on illustrating my find-
ings from these models by generating predicted values of candidates’ total short and long
term campaign responsiveness as captured by the long run multipliers and presenting them
graphically. First, however, note that the estimated coefficients for the short term effects —
i.e. the differenced variables of the opponent’s advertising — suggest a general pattern of
contemporaneous issue agenda convergence among candidates. The interaction terms fur-
ther suggest that this tendency towards issue agenda convergence is stronger in competitive
elections than it is in noncompetitive elections.
Figure 1.2 shows the total predicted effects of a one standard deviation increase in
the number of opponent-sponsored advertisements mentioning party-owned issues on a
17I ran a number of models with different specifications, measures, and levels of aggregation. In one, I
included dummy variables for each of the media markets included in my analysis. Their inclusion did not
alter the substantive character of my findings, so I report the model which does not include these dummies
for ease of presentation. In another, I included an ordinal rather than dichotomous measure of electoral
competition, which also did not alter my findings. I also ran models set up between winners and losers
rather than Democrats and Republicans. Again, this did not affect the substance of my findings. I further
ran single equation random effects models and models with random intercepts for the year, state, and media
markets. These choices did not alter my findings. I also ran models using an alternate operationalization of
my issue agendas in which I measured the percentage of ads candidates ran in a week mentioning Democratic
or Republican-owned issues rather than the volume of advertising. This model also shows that candidates
converge in response to their opponents, though the conditioning effect of competition that I report in the
main text of this paper appears to be less powerful. I ran an additional model in which I only used data from
the non-presidential years and found similar results to those presented in Table 1.4. I also ran my main model
and those I described above with data aggregated at the daily rather than weekly level and at the state rather
than media market level, neither of which altered the substance of my findings. See (Banda 2013) for an
issue-by-issue analysis of the dynamics of issue convergence in a similar set of cases.
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Figure 1.1: Party-Owned Issue Agendas in Two Contests
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Note: The predicted effects plotted here are generated by one standard deviation increases in a candidate’s
opponent’s party-owned issue emphasis.
Figure 1.2: Total Short and Long Run Predicted Effects of Candidates’ Volume of Party-
Owned Issue Ads on the Advertising Behavior of their Opponents
22
candidate’s own volume of party-owned issue advertising. These effects were generated
using the long run multipliers. Recall that the long run multiplier in an expression of the
total short and long term effects of a change in an endogenous covariate on an outcome
variable.18 As shown in Figure 1.2, a one standard deviation — about 74 advertisements
— increase in the number of Republican-sponsored ads mentioning Democratic issues on
average leads Democratic candidates to run an additional 36 ads about Democratic issues in
noncompetitive elections. In competitive elections, Democrats instead respond by running
approximately 42 more ads. Republican candidates in noncompetitive elections respond to
a standard deviation — 87.5 ads — increase in the number of advertisements mentioning
Democratic-owned issues by running about 26 more ads. In competitive elections, this
number increases to just under 34 additional advertisements.
The pattern of response among candidates is similar for advertisements mentioning
Republican-owned issues. A one standard deviation — 86.7 advertisements — increase in
the number of Republican-sponsored ads mentioning Republican-owned issues on average
leads Democratic candidates to run about 35 and 48 more ads respectively in noncom-
petitive and competitive elections. For Republican candidates, these increases are nearly
identical: approximately 35 additional advertisements in noncompetitive elections and just
shy of 48 more advertisements in competitive elections for a one standard deviation — just
under 80 ads — increase in the number of Democratic-sponsored advertisements mention-
ing Republican-owned issues.
The pattern shown in Figure 1.2 is clear: Democratic and Republican candidates both
respond to increases in the number of party-owned ads their opponents run by increasing
the number of advertisements they air themselves mentioning the same set of party-owned
18Long run multipliers can either be estimated using the Bewley (1979) transformation — which also
generates a standard error — or by dividing the coefficient of the lag of an endogenous variable by the
negative of the coefficient estimated for the lagged dependent variable (see DeBoef and Keele 2008).
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issues. They do so to a greater extent in competitive elections, which suggests that candi-
dates are more responsive to one another in more competitive campaign environments.19
The standard errors associated with the long run multipliers for competitive elections indi-
cate that the quantities presented in the figure for competitive and noncompetitive elections
differ significantly (p ≤ .05) from one another.
I present a brief analysis of the correlation of the residuals generated by each of the
equations of my seemingly unrelated regression model in Table 1.5. There is a surprisingly
low level of correlation among the residuals; the strongest correlation between residuals is
-.268. Correlations this low indicate that I could have run separate models without risking
biasing my results. Even so, given that I am modeling simultaneous candidate behavior
over time, a seemingly unrelated regression was the correct choice both theoretically and
methodologically.
1.5 Conclusion
The results of my analysis suggest that U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidates react
to one another dynamically by altering their party-owned issue agendas in response to those
put forth by their opponents. These results provide support for the expectations generated
by issue agenda convergence theory rather than the expectation of nonresponse generated
by other theories of issue emphasis (e.g. Simon 2002). The convergence I observe in my
analysis appears to be even stronger in competitive campaigns than it is in noncompetitive
campaigns.
The results of this research lead to three implications. The first stems from the finding
that candidates can be encouraged to engage sets of issues — in this case the issues that
are owned by the party of their opponents — they might otherwise prefer to avoid if their
opponents increase the level of attention they give these issues.20 Issue agenda convergence,
19I present a distributed lag plot of these effects over five weeks that interested readers may examine in the
appendix. The vast majority of the total effects I present in Figure 1.2 occur contemporaneously.
20This finding does not mean that candidates must necessarily talk about issues in ways that will harm
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while certainly not required for democracy to function, could be useful for citizens because
they may find it easier to evaluate candidates who discuss related issues than candidates
who talk about unrelated issues. Issue agenda convergence on party-owned issues allows
citizens to assess candidates on the same dimensions — those implied by related issues —
when they otherwise might be forced to do so on the basis of disparate dimensions — those
implied by unrelated issues.
The second implication suggested by this research is that citizens may be presented
with a choice between candidates who are more responsive to one another during more
competitive campaigns. This may allow citizens to be better able to assess candidates using
similar sets of considerations. Competition in this sense may be an important component of
a democratic system because it encourages candidates to respond to one another more than
they might in noncompetitive election environments. Candidates in competitive elections
communicate more information to citizens about similar sets of issues. Citizens may then
use this information to form attitudes about candidates and to make direct comparisons
between them.
The third implication centers on what happens after elections. While there is some
evidence that candidates’ issue agendas do not affect election outcomes (Sides 2007), the
theory of issue uptake suggests that legislators often coopt the issue priorities of their op-
ponents even after the campaign ends (Sulkin 2005). Winning candidates, then, continue to
respond to the criticisms leveled against them and the issues discussed by their opponents
once they reach office.
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that candidates are not blind to the election envi-
ronments surrounding them. They react to their opponents and their responsiveness is con-
ditioned by competition. Future research might examine the responsive nature of candidate
strategy across other sets of related issues like social or economic issues, the dynamics of
them. They may reframe the issues in an advantageous manner as shown by Sides (2006) or they may defend
their position.
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candidate behavior in multi-stage elections, or the responsive behavior of candidates across
individual issues.
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Table 1.4: Campaign Advertising and the Dynamics of Candidate
Responsiveness
Democrats Republicans
Democratic issues Republican issues Democratic issues Republican issues
Error correction rate
# Sponsor’s issue adst−1 -0.449* -0.521* -0.459* -0.515*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Opponent’s behavior
∆# Democratic issue ads 0.475* 0.466*
(0.026) (0.026)
∆# Democratic issue ads 0.029 -0.028
∗ competition (0.031) (0.030)
# Democratic issue adst−1 0.205* 0.136*
(0.026) (0.023)
# Democratic issue adst−1 0.034 0.046†
∗ competition (0.030) (0.026)
LRM for # Democratic issue ads 0.456* 0.296*
(0.026) (0.023)
LRM for # Democratic issue ads 0.075* 0.100*
∗ competition (0.030) (0.026)
∆# Republican issue ads 0.286* 0.424*
(0.022) (0.037)
∆# Republican issue ads 0.173* 0.201*
∗ competition (0.025) (0.041)
# Republican issue adst−1 0.211* 0.245*
(0.022) (0.038)
# Republican issue adst−1 0.067* 0.091*
∗ competition (0.024) (0.040)
LRM for # Republican issue ads 0.405* 0.476*
(0.022) (0.037)
LRM for # Republican issue ads 0.128* 0.178*
∗ competition (0.024) (0.040)
Election is competitive -0.910 1.773 -1.040 -1.303
(3.214) (2.699) (2.835) (2.970)
Open seat 11.162* 18.317* 8.072* 5.191†
(2.580) (2.227) (2.669) (2.911)
Candidate is an incumbent 20.665* 18.057* 15.882* 16.835*
(2.859) (2.428) (2.648) (2.870)
Candidate is female -4.356† -3.920† 4.962 6.192
(2.336) (2.000) (4.797) (5.178)
Candidate is black -3.977 -13.678* -25.255* -23.191*
(6.738) (5.811) (8.353) (8.964)
Candidate is Latino/a -13.115* -14.802* 11.403 23.877*
(6.307) (5.416) (10.497) (11.307)
Gubernatorial election 5.127* -0.258 -4.028† -4.467†
(2.459) (2.102) (2.295) (2.509)
Year: 2000 5.143 -7.100† -3.082 -6.001
(4.756) (4.060) (4.431) (4.846)
Year: 2002 2.038 -0.469 -8.475* -7.490
(4.590) (3.920) (4.217) (4.608)
Year: 2003 32.730* -22.574* 1.476 46.193*
(10.138) (8.702) (9.491) (10.298)
Year: 2004 0.486 -1.225 -6.148 3.499
(4.785) (4.094) (4.483) (4.906)
Year: 2008 -7.202 3.540 -9.865* 0.648
(4.487) (3.852) (4.079) (4.474)
Intercept 11.020* -0.346 14.908* 14.318*
(4.313) (3.573) (4.078) (4.309)
R2 0.238 0.263 0.228 0.252
BIC 198,787.4
N 4,531
Note: Dependent variables are the first difference of a given candidate’s number of ads mentioning Democratic or Republican-owned
issues in a week. Estimated OLS coefficients from a seemingly unrelated regression model are reported along with standard errors in
parentheses. Long run multipliers are estimated using the Bewley (1979) transformation.
† p≤ .05 (one tailed), ∗ p≤ .05 (two tailed).
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Table 1.5: Correlation of Residuals
Democratic candidates Republican candidates
Democratic Republican Democratic Republican
issues issues issues issues
Democratic candidates
Democratic issues 1.0000
Republican issues 0.2715 1.0000
Republican candidates
Democratic issues -0.2477 0.0038 1.0000
Republican issues 0.0816 -0.2680 0.2368 1.0000
Note: The cells are correlations of the residuals between the equations reported in
Table 1.4.
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2 ISSUE OWNERSHIP, ISSUE POSITIONS, AND CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT
One of the most important topics that public opinion and campaigns scholars grapple
with is the degree to which citizens are responsive to politics. The classic findings suggest
that citizens tend to be politically inattentive, which may not be surprising given that most
individuals report that they are not interested in politics and that they care little about elec-
toral outcomes (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). More recent work confirms
these findings and further suggests that citizens may not even understand contemporary pol-
icy debates (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). These findings suggest the existence of two
potential problems. The first problem is related to democratic accountability: the public
must respond in reasonable ways to political conditions and events despite being made up
of individuals who tend to be politically inattentive. The second problem is faced by can-
didates, who must communicate with citizens who do not pay attention to or know much
about politics.
The conventional wisdom among scholars of public opinion is that party cues and party
labels are sufficient for citizens to make reasonably informed political decisions (Downs
1957; Conover and Feldman 1982; Feldman and Conover 1983; Rahn 1993) and that is-
sues do not play an important role in the formation of citizens’ attitudes. These findings
suggest the existence of an important puzzle: if issues do not matter because citizens do not
pay attention, then why do citizens claim that they want to know more about candidates’
policy solutions and why do citizens appear to dislike feeling uncertain about candidates’
positions (Bartels 1986; Alvarez 1997; but see Tomz and Van Houweling 2009)? It is also
puzzling that campaigns focus so much attention on the discussion of issues and “staying
on message” if issues do not matter. This research focuses on the following question: how
does discussion of issues and issue positions by a candidate affect citizens’ views of the
candidate’s ideological dispositions and the candidate’s positions on the issues he does and
does not discuss?
Citizens tend to form attitudes about candidates based on key heuristics like party iden-
tification. While party is a powerful shortcut, citizens recognize that not all Democrats
and Republicans are identical. Citizens can update their views of candidates in response to
small bits of policy information embedded within candidates’ messages. These cues may
(1) reduce the uncertainty that citizens feel about candidates’ positions by offering citizens
more information from which they may draw when forming attitudes about candidates and
(2) offer inattentive citizens an easy source of additional information that is useful to those
who seek to learn about candidates while minimizing the costs associated with information
searches.
I focus on the effects of two kinds of information cues on citizens’ attitudes about
candidates. The first, issue ownership cues, are present in messages in which candidates
discuss an issue that is “owned” — or strongly associated with — a party (Petrocik 1996).
Citizens should view the candidates as being more similar to to the party that owns the
issues the candidates discuss. The second kind of cue — “issue position cues” — are
present when candidates identify their positions on issues. Citizens should again think
about candidates in terms of the party associated with the positions candidates outline.
These cues should influence citizens’ views of the candidates by associating them to
one of the two major parties. Issue ownership and issue position cues should affect citi-
zens’ perceptions of candidates’ positions on the issues they talk about because these kinds
of cues explicitly outline those candidates’ positions. These cues should also influence
citizens’ views of the candidates’ general ideological dispositions and their positions on
issues they do not discuss. Citizens tend to cluster issues together by party or candidate, so
a position on one issue may be correlated with a position on another Layman and Carsey
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(e.g. 2002).
I test my theory using a survey experiment embedded in the 2010 Cooperative Con-
gressional Election Study (CCES) in which I exposed participants to statements made by
a fictional Senator. These messages each contained party labels for the Senator. Addition-
ally, all of the experimental treatments contained one of several different combinations of
information cues. I varied the party ownership of the issues discussed in these treatments
along with whether or not positions were present in these messages. Finally, I varied the
positions the candidate took on the issues, which lined up with either the Democratic or the
Republican Party.
I test this theory in three contexts: participants’ placements of the Senator’s ideology,
his positions on the issues he mentioned in the treatments, and his positions on issues he
did not mention. My results show that citizens alter their views of the Senator in response
to these cues and imply that citizens may be more sophisticated that previous research
suggests because the meaning of issue ownership appears to extend beyond perceptions of
issue advantage. The discussion of party-owned issues appears to communicate positional
information about candidates, which further suggests that issues matter and have poten-
tially powerful effects on citizens’ views of political figures above and beyond the effects
produced by party labels.
2.1 Attitude Formation and Issues
Citizens draw information from several sources when forming attitudes about candi-
dates during campaigns. Social cognition research suggests that citizens evaluate candi-
dates by categorizing them based on a social taxonomy in a subconscious attempt to reduce
the complexity of the social world because doing so is the most straightforward way of
reducing political complexity (Conover and Feldman 1989; Kinder 1986; Lodge, McGraw,
and Stroh 1989; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuck 1986; Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, and
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Sullivan 1990). Citizens hold expectations about which issues are associated with mem-
bers of the parties based on stereotypes associated with them (Rahn 1993). Democratic
and Republican elected officials have long exhibited consistently different policy prefer-
ences (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page 1978) and reputations (Snyder and
Ting 2002), a fact that likely reenforces Americans’ tendency to think about politics in
terms of groups (Converse 1964). Party labels and other partisan cues provide voters with
information shortcuts (Downs 1957) and knowledge about the partisanship of a candidate
allows people to make useful inferences (Conover 1981; Granberg, Kasmer, and Nanneman
1988; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Hurwitz 1985; Jacoby 1988; Page 1978; Riggle, Ot-
tati, Wyer, Kuklinski, and Schwartz 1992; Wright and Niemi 1983). In short, cognitive
heuristics may make political attitude formation and decision-making easier for citizens
(but see Lau and Redlawsk 2001).
There is some evidence that citizens are unable to recall the issues that candidates talk
about during campaigns (e.g. Dalager 1996). If this is true, it would suggest that the issues
candidates choose to discuss in campaigns are irrelevant. However, there is evidence that
repetition in campaign advertising reinforces associations between issues and candidates
(Claibourn 2008) and that citizens evaluate candidates and people more generally using an
on-line process (Hamilton and Sherman 1996; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge,
Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; McGraw and Stroh 1990; McGraw and Dolan 2007). This
suggests that even if citizens forget specifics, they will still update their attitudes about
candidates to reflect the information to which they have been exposed.
2.1.1 Party Ownership of Issues and Candidate Assessment
The issue ownership literature suggest that certain issues have become associated with
the parties in the sense that they are perceived by the electorate to be “owned” by one of the
parties (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003; Egan
Forthcoming). Parties take ownership of issues by repeatedly and consistently addressing
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problems stemming from the issues over time. When parties are successful, citizens on
average believe the party that owns an issue is better able to handle problems related to that
issue than parties that do not own the issue.1 Issue ownership, then, can be thought of as
a form of issue advantage that originates from the perceived strengths and weaknesses of
political parties rather than of individual candidates.
While some proponents of issue ownership argue that candidates should rarely if ever
discuss the issues owned by their opponents and should avoid discussing the same issues as
their opponents (e.g. Simon 2002), more recent work suggests that “issue trespassing” —
the discussion of issues owned by a different party — occurs frequently in U.S. campaigns
and that candidates competing against each other often discuss the same issues (Sigel-
man and Buell 2004; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Sides 2006; Banda 2011; Banda and
Carsey 2012). Sides (2006) finds that candidates who discuss their opponents’ issues do
so by reframing the issue in a way to emphasize the strengths of the candidate or her party
(see also Holian 2004). While there is evidence that candidates are covered in a more pos-
itive way when the news media focuses more attention on the issues those candidates own
(Hayes 2008), it does not appear that the issue agendas of candidates as they relate to issue
ownership have strong effects on electoral outcomes (Sides 2007).
Scholars of issue ownership have mostly focused on the issue advantage dimension of
issue ownership and have not yet considered how issue ownership affects the ways citizens
view candidates’ ideological and issue positions. If citizens associate some issues with
specific parties, then they should — in the absence of positional information — view can-
didates who discuss a party-owned issue as being more ideologically congruent with the
party that owns the issue than they otherwise would have. In this sense, citizens should
1In the U.S., the Democratic Party tends to own issues related to social welfare, social class and group
relations, gender equality, civil rights, and civil liberties. Republicans tend to own issues like crime, national
security, lifestyles, and taxation. See Petrocik (1996) for more examples and Egan (Forthcoming) for updated
survey data that largely confirms Petrocik’s initial coding scheme.
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be able to learn about the ideological dispositions of candidates even in the face of oth-
erwise ambiguous information. Similarly, when a candidate takes a position commonly
associated with a party, the candidate should also be viewed as being more ideologically
congruent with the party associated with that position. Citizens should also assess candi-
dates’ positions on issues they discuss in a similar fashion - by responding to information
cues embedded within candidates’ messages.
Citizens should also use the information that they have at their disposal to infer candi-
dates’ positions on issues that are not discussed. For example, a candidate who has taken
consistently conservative (liberal) positions on a number of issues may be viewed as hold-
ing conservative (liberal) positions on other issues. This sort of inference is reasonable
because political elites are ideologically constrained to a greater extent than are citizens
(Converse 1964). Politicians generally hold positions that are at the very least moderately
cohesive with their parties and clear messages are likely to be strong in the contempo-
rary period given the high levels of party polarization exhibited in the U.S. Congress (e.g.
Poole and Rosenthal 2007). In addition, the messages explicated by the parties during and
between campaigns suggest that members tend to hold fairly cohesive sets of preferences
(Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman and Carsey 2002).
2.2 Information Cues and Candidate Assessment
The messages communicated by candidates to citizens during campaigns can contain
information cues that affect citizens’ views of the candidate by associating that candidate
with one of the two major U.S. political parties. These cues vary on two dimensions.
The first dimension is that of ownership; do the messages discuss issues that are owned
by either the candidate’s party or the opposing party? The second dimension is centered
on positions contained within candidates’ messages. A candidate’s messages may contain
positions that are congruent with their own party, congruent with the opponent’s party, or
they may mention no positions at all. Table 2.1 contains a two by three matrix summarizing
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Table 2.1: Cue Types
Party Ownership
In-party Out-party
Positions
None In-party ownership cues Out-party ownership cues
Congruent In-party ownership, congruent positions Out-party ownership, congruent positions
Incongruent In-party ownership, incongruent positions Out-party ownership, incongruent positions
this typology, which I further describe below.
2.2.1 Issue Ownership and Issue Position Cues
The messages communicated by candidates to citizens during campaigns can contain
two kinds of information cues: issue position cues and issue ownership cues. When candi-
dates identify their position on an issue, they are sending a clear signal via an issue position
cue about their ideological disposition that citizens should be able to translate into attitudes
about the candidates’ ideologies and positions on issues. These cues should be difficult
for citizens to misinterpret because they are contained within messages containing explicit
information about candidates.
Candidates do not always want to identify their positions, but they can still send po-
sitional signals to citizens by choosing to discuss certain kinds of issues. As detailed in
the previous section, some issues are so closely related to a party that they are “owned”
by that party. Candidates can transmit positional signals to citizens by discussing a party
owned issue without taking a position on that issue. These kinds of messages contain an
issue ownership cue. This information is implicit because the candidate does not directly
communicate her position on the issue. Instead, she allows citizens to infer her ideological
and issue positions using the information implied by the issue ownership cue, which asso-
ciates the candidate with the party that owns the issue the candidate discussed. Given the
close relationship between issues and the party that owns them, citizens should use issue
ownership cues to inform their attitudes about candidates.
When citizens hear candidates talk about issues without taking positions on those is-
sues, issue ownership cues should lead citizens to think about the candidates in terms of
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the party that owns the issue. For example, a Democratic candidate who talks about taxes
— a Republican owned issue — but does not take a position should be viewed as being
more conservative and as holding positions on issues that are more congruent with the Re-
publican Party than she would have had the candidate avoided discussing issues.2 In other
words, citizens should assess the candidate as being more similar to the Republican Party.
Citizens should react similarly when they hear candidates take positions on issues. Peo-
ple associate positions on many issues with parties, so when a candidate takes Democratic
positions on one or more issues, people should infer that the candidate is more liberal than
they might have thought had the candidate not identified a position. Citizens who know
that this candidate holds Democratic positions on issues should also assess them as hold-
ing positions that are more congruent with the Democratic Party on these issues than they
would have had they not been exposed to messages containing issue position cues.
I further argue that issue position cues should dominate issue ownership cues. In other
words, citizens who are exposed to a message that contains both should only respond to
issue position cues. This is because issue position cues contain more explicit information
that should overwhelm the effect of the implicit information contained in the ownership
cue. For example, if a citizen heard a Democratic candidate take a Republican position on
a Democratic issue, she should respond to the position cue when forming an assessment of
the candidate rather than the ownership cue because the former explicitly informs her that
the candidate shares some commonalities with the Republican Party.
Because candidates do not discuss all political issues, citizens must infer the positions
they hold on these issues based on the information to which they have access — the issues
candidates choose to talk about and the positions they explicate. Citizens should infer that
a candidate who exhibits conservative (liberal) policy preferences also holds conservative
2Note that this does not imply that the Democratic candidate in this example should be viewed as being
as conservative as a generic Republican candidate, merely that they should be viewed as more conservative
than they would have been had they avoided discussing issues entirely.
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(liberal) preferences on issues that she does not address because partisan elites tend to
exhibit higher levels of attitude constraint than do non-elites (Converse 1964) and parties
and the media reenforce the notion that party elites exhibit ideological consistency.
Figure 2.1 contains a graphical representation of the process I outlined above for the
example of citizens’ views of candidates’ ideological positions. Panel (a) shows the kind
of perceptions citizens might have of a generic Democrat — D — and Republican — R
— in which the Democrat is viewed as being more liberal than the Republican. Panel (b)
shows the change in perceptions my theoretical argument would lead me to expect given the
presence of a “congruent cue,” one which suggests the candidates are more like their own
parties. This could be either a position cue or an ownership cue. For example, a Democrat
might talk about Democratic owned issues without outlining their position or may explicate
a position associated with the Democratic Party. In this case, perceptions of the candidates’
ideological positions should shift towards the poles as the candidates become increasingly
associated with their own parties. Finally, Panel (c) shows the expected effect of an “incon-
gruent cue,” one that associates a candidate with the opposing party. In this case, citizens’
views of the candidates should shift towards the opposing poles. As shown in the figure,
these kinds of cues should lead to the candidates being viewed as holding more moderate
ideological positions than candidates who communicate no information at all beyond their
partisanship.
2.2.2 Partisanship and Information Cues
Partisanship is one of the most stable forces in American politics (Campbell et al. 1960;
Jacoby 1988; Rahn 1993). Given the centrality of this concept, it is important to consider
how my theory of citizen response to the issue ownership and issue position cues may
be influenced by partisanship. Some scholars argue that partisanship is a form of social
identity (e.g. Huddy 2001; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) while others view it as
a psychological attachment (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2002; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby,
37
(a) Generic candidates
(b) Congruent cues
(c) Incongruent cues
Figure 2.1: Issue Position and Issue Ownership Cues’ Effects on Citizens Views of Candi-
dates’ Positions
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Norporth, and Weisberg 2008), but both sets of scholars agree that partisanship powerfully
shapes public opinion and mass political behavior.
Many scholars who study the formation of social identities argue that citizens tend to
categorize people as members of in and out-groups. Citizens identify themselves with the
former while differentiating themselves from the latter (Tajfel 1982; Brewer 2007). In pol-
itics, citizens’ conceptions of in and out-groups tend to center on partisanship (e.g. Huddy
2001; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Proponents of this formulation of social
identity theory posit that people have powerful biases that favor in-groups relative to out-
groups. Partisans, then, view members of their own party more positively than members of
other parties. People do so in order to satisfy their innate need for a positive social identity
and in order to maintain intergroup distinctiveness (see Brewer 1991).
This perspective leads to the expectation that the proclivity of citizens to respond to
political information is conditioned by the way they view the source of that information.
They should be more apt to accept - and thus be responsive to - information that originates
from a source they view as credible than from a source they do not view as credible (Druck-
man 2001). In other words, citizens should be more likely to respond to information cues
embedded in candidates’ messages when citizens and candidates identify with the same
party relative to when they do not. Citizens who view the messages of a candidate from the
opposing party should discount the cue when forming an attitude and may go so far as to
ignore it entirely.
The psychological perspective is less clear on the effects of partisanship on citizen
response to these kinds of source cues. (Bartels 2002) argues that people update their views
of political objects in a Bayesian manner. In this conception, the opinions of Democrats and
Republicans may be divided, but they respond to information in similar ways. For example,
if citizens were exposed to an issue frame designed to increase support for a policy, this line
of thought suggests that it might do so at a similar rate among both groups of partisans. We
39
might still observe a gap in the level of support between the two groups after citizens were
exposed to the frame, but support for the policy should have increased similarly among
both partisan groups. In other words, party may condition the baseline views that citizens
hold towards candidates, but it should not influence the way they respond to the information
cues embedded in candidates’ messages. 3 This perspective, then, predicts that citizens will
respond to issue ownership and issue position cues regardless of whether or not they share
their party identification with a given candidate. The previous perspective, on the other
hand, predicts that citizens who share their partisanship with candidates will respond more
powerfully to these cues than will citizens who do not.
2.3 Research Design
I test my theory of candidate assessment by using a survey experiment contained in
the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). My sample includes 1,561
participants across two separate “team content” modules of equal size. Respondents are
generally representative of the population of adult U.S. citizens as a whole, though people
with higher levels of education and greater interest in politics tend to be overrepresented.
These data are, however, better than those used in many experimental designs because the
CCES allows me to experiment on a much larger and more representative sample of the
electorate that is more diverse than the typical convenience samples made up primarily of
undergraduate students or members of a single community.
3(Fiorina 1981) offers a third perspective on partisanship’s potential for conditioning citizen response to
candidates’ information cues. This perspective rests on the notion that partisanship is a cumulative tally of
a citizen’s previous evaluations of the political parties. This argument is similar to Bartels’ in that it allows
for differences in public opinion between Democrats and Republicans. However, this perspective leads to the
expectation that opinion among members of both parties converges over time as people update their views in
response to objective political information. “Objective information” is the key phrase here; if citizens do not
view information as credible, they have little reason to respond to it.
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Survey experiments are useful because they provide researchers with the ability to de-
termine which factors cause the behaviors of interest. Furthermore, when the sample uti-
lized for a survey experiment is representative of the population of interest, the general-
izability of a researcher’s findings expands. Even so, as has been recently noted by some
scholars, survey experiments may still face problems relating to external validity (Gaines,
Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007; Kinder 2007). Barabas and Jerit (2010), for example, find that
the effects observed in a survey experiment may not translate to the population as a whole
because they are driven primarily by responses among members of certain subgroups. The
results I outline in this research should be interpreted as the effects of issue ownership
and issue position cues on the views held by those citizens who might be exposed to sim-
ilar political messages in the real world, not necessarily on all citizens regardless of their
proclivity to become exposed to political information.
2.3.1 Experimental Design
The CCES is completed by participants online.4 Participants were first asked to answer
a number of demographic and political questions. They were then asked to read a short
statement made by a fictional Senator from “another state.”5 Finally, they were asked to
assess the Senator’s ideology and positions on several issues. The initial prompt read as
follows:
We would like your reaction to some comments made at a recent re-election
campaign appearance by a Senator from a different state, [Democratic/Republican]
Senator Franklin, who said:
The Senator’s partisanship was randomly assigned with equal probability as either a
Democrat or a Republican. Next, participants were randomly assigned to a treatment, each
4Internet survey research is significantly cheaper than many other survey collection methods, but because
the distribution of internet access is not uniform, internet samples could be biased towards younger, better
educated, and wealthier people. YouGov provided internet access to people who lacked it, which helps to
alleviate this problem.
5Participants were not told that this Senator was fictional.
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Table 2.2: Treatment Assignment
Issue Ownership
In-party Out-party
No issues 223 - -
No positions - 232 214
Congruent positions - 222 210
Incongruent positions - 244 216
of which contained a short set of statements attributed to the Senator. These statements
along with the Senator’s randomly assigned partisanship combined to form the treatments
received by participants. I varied whether or not the Senator talked about issues, the party
ownership of the issues he talked about, whether or not he expressed his positions on the
issues, and whether or not the positions he took were congruent with his party. Table 3.1
summarizes the random assignment of participants into each treatment group.6 The “no
issues” treatment serves as the control group in my analyses.
When the fictional Senator talked about issues, he discussed issues that were owned by
either the Democratic or Republican Party. The Democratic-owned issues were affirmative
action and health care while the Republican-owned issues were taxes and national defense.
In all cases, when the Senator’s statements contained any issue content, that content was
about only Democratic or Republican owned issues. In other words, when candidates talked
about issues they communicated issue position or issue ownership cues. The full text of
each treatment can be found in the appendix.
2.3.2 Treatments
Participants who received the control treatment read a statement in which the Senator
avoided issues entirely. Nothing in the Senator’s statement should have led participants to
assess him differently than they would otherwise have done. The only cue embedded in this
6Approximately equal numbers of participants received each treatment. The rates of exposure per treat-
ment are nearly identical for participants across CCES modules. Note that participants could have been
exposed to two additional experimental treatments which are not presented in this research. A combined 439
participants received one of the two omitted treatments.
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treatment was the Senator’s partisanship. Participants’ views of the Senator in response to
this treatment serve as the baseline for comparison throughout my analyses.
Next I will describe the six experimental treatments that are summarized in Table 3.1.
The first pair represent the issue ownership cues treatments. Participants in the “in-party
ownership cues” treatment were exposed to statements in which the Senator talked about
issues that were owned by his party and did not identify his positions on the issues. In
the “out-party ownership cues” treatment, participants read statements in which the Sen-
ator talked about issues that were owned by his opponent’s party. The statements in this
treatment were also devoid of positional information.
The remaining experimental treatments contain issue position cues, each of which ex-
posed participants to statements involving both issues and the candidate’s positions. The
statements made in the “in-party ownership, congruent positions” treatment contained men-
tions of issues that were owned by the Senator’s party and positions on those issues that
would be expected given his partisanship. Participants who received the “out-party own-
ership, congruent positions” treatment were exposed to a statement in which the Senator
discussed issues owned by his opponent’s party. He once again took positions congruent
with his party on these issues. In the “in-party ownership, incongruent positions” treatment,
participants were exposed to a statement in which the Senator discussed issues owned by
his party and, rather than taking positions on those issues that might be expected given his
party, took positions in line with his opponent’s party.7 Subjects who received the “out-
party ownership, incongruent positions” treatment read statements in which the Senator
talked about issues owned by his opponent’s party and took positions on those issues that
were associated with his opponent’s party.
7In other words, the text of this statement for a Democratic Senator is identical to that of a Republican
Senator in the “out-party ownership, congruent positions” treatment. The only difference between the two is
the Senator’s partisanship.
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2.3.3 Measurement and Modeling
After being exposed to a statement attributed to the Senator, participants were asked
a series of questions about their views of him. They were first asked to place him on an
ideological scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Participants were then
asked to place the candidate on issues scales for the four issues the Senator could have
talked about — affirmative action, health care, taxation, and national defense — and two
issues that he never mentioned in any treatment — abortion and government provision of
services.8
Participants in both CCES modules received the same treatments and were asked to
answer the questions about the same issues, but their assessments of the Senator were mea-
sured in different ways. In one module, respondents placed the Senator on the standard
seven point ideological scale and placed him on eleven point scales for each of the six is-
sues. In the second module, participants placed the candidates ideologically and on issues
using a scale that ranged from 0 to 100. Because my findings are robust to either measure-
ment strategy, I combine the responses from both modules by transforming the 0 to 100
point measures to seven point ideological and eleven point issue position measures for ease
of presentation.
In order to better test the expectations generated by my theory in a single model, I
rescaled participants’ assessments of the Senator so that low values indicated that he was
assessed as being less congruent with his party while high values indicated that he was
perceived of as being more congruent with his party both ideologically and on issues.9
For example, a Democratic Senator who was assessed as being ideologically conservative
would have a low score while a Republican who was also viewed as being conservative
8The text of each question may be found in the appendix.
9My substantive findings are not affected by this decision because the treatment effects operate in similar
ways for both the Democratic and the Republican versions of the Senator. I performed a separate set of
analyses on the Democratic and Republican versions of the Senator, the results of which were substantively
identical to those I present in this research.
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Figure 2.2: Ideological Continuum
would have a high score.10 This rescaling leads to a measure for which low values indicate
assessments that are incongruent with the Senator’s party while higher values represent
greater perceived congruence ideologically and on issues with the candidate’s party.
Figure 2.2 contains a concrete example of this rescaling. I plot the average ideological
assessments of the Senator made by participants who received the control treatment (CD
and CR) and the “in-party ownership, congruent positions” treatment (ED and ER) on the
top line. The D subscript refers to a Senator that was identified as a Democrat while the R
subscript is for participants who observed a Republican Senator. Note that this treatment
appears to shift assessments on average towards the ideological pole that is associated with
the candidate’s party; the Democratic version of the Senator was assessed as being more
liberal while the Republican version was assessed as being more conservative. This treat-
ment contains an issue position cue that should have lead participants to associate the Sen-
ator with the Senator’s party to a greater degree than did the participants who received the
control treatment. These data suggest that the treatment was effective.
I plot the average ideological assessments made by participants receiving the control
10For the Republican Senator: ideology - 4. For the Democratic Senator: -1 ∗ (ideology - 4). For the
eleven point issue scales: position - 5 for the Republican version of the Senator and -1 ∗ (position - 5) for the
Democratic version.
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treatment (CT ) and the same experimental treatment (ET ) after transformation on the sec-
ond line in Figure 2.2. Note that the same pattern observed in the raw scores is shown here
again; participants who received the “in-party ownership, congruent positions” treatment
on average assessed the Senator as holding an ideological position more congruent with
his party than did those who received the control treatment. I use transformed measures of
ideological and issue congruence with the candidate’s party in my analyses. The range of
participants’ ideological assessments of the Senator runs from -3 to 3 while the transformed
issue assessments go from -5 to 5. These measures of perceived congruence serve as the
dependent variables in my analyses.
I use ordinary least squares regression to model participants’ perceptions of the Sen-
ator’s congruence with his party ideologically and on issues that the Senator did and did
not discuss.11 The independent variables in my models are a series of dummy variables
indicating whether or not a participant received each of the eight experimental treatments.
I do not include a dummy variable indicating whether or not participants received the con-
trol treatment because it functions as the excluded category with which I will compare the
effects of the experimental treatments.12 Equation 2.1 represents the form of the models I
report. I estimate separate models for each issue and the candidate’s perceived ideological
11The ideological and issue congruence measures are seven and eleven point ordinal scales respectively.
Ordered models may be more appropriate given the form of these data, but I chose to use linear models for
three reasons. First, linear models with dummy variables are substantively equivalent to a series of difference
of means tests. Second, results generated by a linear model are easier to present in a straightforward manner
than are those from an ordered model. Third, I replicated my analyses using ordered logistic regression and
found the same substantive results as the linear models I report below.
12I also ran two different sets of models, the results of which may be found in the appendix. In the first, I
included a dummy variable indicating whether or not a participant shared their partisanship with the Senator
and interacted this indicator with each of the experimental treatment dummies. These models tested the extent
to which partisanship conditioned the effects of the treatments. The results of these models suggested that
the partisan perceptual filters of participants did not affect their responses to the treatments.
In the second set of models, I included a measure of education and interacted it with the treatments in order
to ascertain the degree to which my treatment effects were conditioned by participants’ levels of educational
attainment. These models suggested that education sometimes had a conditioning effect, but not consistently
across treatments in the various models. However, when education did condition response to the treatments, it
magnified participants’ responsiveness to the issue ownership and issue position cues, i.e. the better educated
exhibited more powerful responses to the treatments.
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congruence.
Ideological or issue congruence = β0 + β1Treatment1 + . . . β6Treatment6 +  (2.1)
The intercept of these models represents the average assessed congruence of the Sena-
tor made by participants who received the control treatment. The coefficients produced for
each dummy indicate the average additive effect of the treatments on participants’ percep-
tions of the Senator’s congruence with his party.
2.3.4 Expectations
I expect to observe that the cues contained within the statements in each experimental
treatment lead participants to alter their views of the Senator relative to the views expressed
by those who received the control treatment. When a message contains an issue position
cue, I expect participants to respond to it by viewing the candidate as more like the party
associated with the positions the candidate takes. When a message contains only an issue
ownership cue, I expect to observe that citizens view the candidate are being more like the
party that owns the issue that the candidate discusses.
Table 2.3 summarizes the expected signs of the treatment dummies’ coefficients. Posi-
tive coefficients indicate that the average effect of a treatment should shift assessments of
the Senator in the direction that is congruent with the Senator’s party. This means that a
Democratic Senator would be assessed as being more liberal ideologically and on issues
while a Republican Senator would be viewed as being more conservative. Negative coeffi-
cients, on the other hand, indicate that the average effect of a treatment shifts assessments
of the Senator away from that which would normally be expected of his party. In other
words, a Republican Senator would be viewed as being more liberal and a Democratic
Senator would be assessed as being more conservative.
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Table 2.3: Expected Signs of the Treatment
Dummies’ Estimated Coefficients Relative to
the Control Group
Issue Ownership
In-party Out-party
No positions + –
Congruent positions + +
Incongruent positions – –
Note: These expectations hold for both assess-
ments of the Senator’s positions on issues as
well as of his ideology. ns = not significantly
different than zero.
More specifically, I expect participants who receive the “in-party ownership cues” treat-
ment to assess the Senator as being more congruent with his own party ideologically and
on issues than participants who receive the control treatment. If the Senator is a Demo-
crat, this means that assessments should shift to the left while they should shift to the right
relative to the control group if the Senator is a Republican. I expect that participants who
receive the “out-party ownership cues” treatment to shift their assessments of the Senator
in the opposite direction; these participants should assess the Senator as being less congru-
ent with his party both ideologically and on issues than did those who received the control
treatment.
I expect that participants who receive a treatment in which candidates take positions
on issues will view the candidates as being more congruent with the party associated with
those positions. When the Senator takes positions that would normally be expected of
Democrats (Republicans), participants should assess him as being more liberal (conserva-
tive) ideologically and on issues. I therefore expect that participants who receive both the
“in-party ownership, congruent positions” and “out-party ownership, congruent positions”
treatments to view the Senator as being more congruent with his party than participants in
the control group. I furthermore expect subjects who receive either the “in-party owner-
ship, incongruent positions” or the “in-party ownership, incongruent positions” treatments
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Table 2.4: Perceived Ideological Congruence of the Senator with the Senator’s Party
Estimated coefficient Standard error
Issue ownership cues
In-party ownership cues 0.44* (0.15)
Out-party ownership cues -0.73* (0.15)
Issue position cues
In-party ownership, congruent positions 0.76* (0.15)
Out-party ownership, congruent positions 0.56* (0.15)
In-party ownership, incongruent positions -1.41* (0.14)
Out-party ownership, incongruent positions -1.62* (0.15)
Intercept 0.74* (0.10)
N 1,548
BIC 5,787.87
Note: cell entries are estimated coefficients and standard errors generated using ordinary
least squares regression.
* = p ≤ .05 (one tailed)
to view the Senator as being less congruent with his party on issues and ideologically.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Ideological Congruence
I report the results of the model estimating participants’ assessments of the Senator’s
ideological congruence with his party in Table 2.4. These results are consistent with all of
my theoretical expectations. Participants’ assessments of the Senator’s ideological congru-
ence appear to be powerfully informed — above and beyond party labels — by both issue
ownership and issue position cues. This suggests that the perceptions of citizens more gen-
erally should also be affected in the same way, at least among those who are exposed to
messages containing these kinds of cues.
The mean and standard deviation of participants’ assessments of the Senator’s ideology
were 0.46 and 1.76 respectively on a scale ranging from -3 to 3. The intercept of the model
represents the average ideological assessment of the candidate reported by participants who
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received the control treatment. At 0.74, this coefficient suggests that people responded to
the party cues embedded in this treatment by assessing the Senator as holding an ideolog-
ical position roughly three quarters of a point on the seven point ideological scale in the
direction suggested by the candidate’s party.
The coefficient for the “in-party ownership cues” indicator is positive and differs sig-
nificantly from zero, indicating that when a Democratic (Republican) Senator talked about
Democratic (Republican) owned issues, he was viewed as being more liberal (conserva-
tive). Similarly, the negative coefficient of the “out-party ownership cues” dummy also
differs significantly from zero and suggests that on average, the people who received this
treatment assessed a Democratic (Republican) Senator as being more conservative (liberal)
when he talked about Republican (Democratic) owned issues but did not take any positions.
In addition, the size of this coefficient (-0.73) is nearly identical to that of the intercept
(0.74), which indicates that that the “out-party ownership cues” treatment negated most
of the influence of the party cues on participants’ perceptions of the Senator’s ideological
congruence with his party. In other words, this treatment on average lead participants to
place the Senator at the center of the ideological scale and thus view him as an ideological
moderate.13
These results also suggest that people used the information about the positions the Sen-
ator outlined in his statements when they assessed his ideology. Leaving aside the two
treatments containing competing cues for now, when the Senator took positions on issues
that were in line with his party, he was on average assessed as being more congruent ide-
ologically with his party regardless of which party’s issues he talked about. The estimated
coefficients for both the “in-party ownership, congruent positions” and the “out-party own-
ership, congruent positions” treatment indicators are both positive and differ significantly
130.74 + (−0.73) = 0.01.
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from zero. The coefficient of the former treatment on average shifts participants’ assess-
ments of the Senator’s ideological congruence with his party even further towards congru-
ence than do the party cues on their own (an additional 0.76 units more congruent than the
control group’s average assessments of 0.74 on the seven point scale).
Participants who received treatments in which the Senator took positions in line with
his opponent’s party on average viewed him as being less ideologically congruent with
his own party. The estimated coefficients for both the “in-party ownership, incongruent
positions” and the “out-party ownership, incongruent positions” dummies are negative and
differ significantly from zero. Both coefficients are quite large and overwhelm the effects
of party cues. While participants who received the control treatment on average assessed
the Senator as being more congruent with his party ideologically — 0.74 units on the -3 to
3 scale — participants who received one of these treatments on average viewed the Senator
as being virtually the ideological mirror image of the party cues only Senator — -0.67 and
-0.89 units on the same scale.14
2.4.2 Issue Position Congruence
Table 2.5 contains the results of the models estimating participants’ assessments of the
Senator’s congruence with his party on the four issues that could have been discussed in
the experimental treatments: health care, affirmative action, taxes, and national defense.
Each of the dependent variables here range from least (-5) to most (5) congruent with the
Senator’s party on a given issue. The intercepts once again represent the average placement
of the Senator by those who received the control treatment. Each intercept indicates that
the party labels in the control treatment lead participants to view the Senator as holding
positions on each of the issues the Senator could have discussed that was about one unit
away from the center of the position scale and towards the implied position of the party of
the Senator.
14I generated these values simply by summing the intercept and the coefficient of interest together.
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Table 2.5: Perceived Congruence on Mentioned Issues of the Senator with the Senator’s
Party
Health care Affirmative action Taxes National defense
Issue ownership cues
In-party ownership cues 0.26 0.05 -0.09 0.29
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.24)
Out-party ownership cues -0.89* -0.86* -0.54* -0.62*
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.24)
Issue position cues
In-party ownership, 0.87* 0.70* 0.21 0.48*
congruent positions (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.24)
Out-party ownership, 0.53* 0.71* 0.54* 0.24
congruent positions (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.24)
In-party ownership, -1.78* -1.79* -1.81* -1.46*
incongruent positions (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.23)
Out-party ownership, -1.85* -1.80* -1.67* -1.91*
incongruent positions (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.24)
Intercept 1.19* 1.15* 1.30* 1.06*
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.17)
N 1,516 1,507 1,507 1,496
BIC 7,697.94 7,620.10 7,580.01 6,991.80
Note: cell entries are estimated coefficients generated using ordinary least squares regression.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* = p ≤ .05 (one tailed)
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The first row of results shows the effects of the “in-party ownership cues” treatment on
each of the four issues that the Senator may have discussed. Three of the four coefficients
are positive as expected, but none differ significantly from zero, thus indicating that this
treatment did not on average lead participants who were exposed to it to view the Senator’s
position differently than did those who were exposed to the control treatment. As shown
by the results in the second row, the “out-party ownership cues” treatment on average lead
participants to view the Senator as holding positions on these issues that were less congru-
ent with his party. The sizes of these effects across models ranged from 42% to 75% of the
size of the effects produced by the control treatment containing only a party label.15
The third and fourth rows of results show that the treatments in which the Senator
took positions that were consistent with his party — the “in-party ownership, congruent
positions” and the “out-party ownership, congruent positions” treatments — produced re-
sults that were consistent with my expectations. All eight coefficients are positive and six
differed significantly from zero, indicating that on average taking positions that were con-
sistent with the Senator’s party lead participants to assess him as being more congruent
with his party on these four issues. The sizes of the significant effects ranged from 42% to
72% of the effect sizes produced by the control treatments.
The results presented in the fifth and sixth rows of Table 2.5 indicate that the presence of
issue position cues suggesting that the Senator held different positions than his party on the
issues he discussed on average lead participants to view him as being less congruent with
his party on each of the four issues. All of the coefficients produced by these treatments
are negative and differ significantly from zero. The effects that these treatments produce
are also all larger than those generated by the control treatment’s party cue.
Table 2.6 contains the results of two models estimating participants’ views of the Sen-
ator’s congruence with his party on two issues that were not mentioned in any treatment:
15I am assuming that the effect of the party labels is equivalent to the difference between the intercept and
the midpoint (0) of the issue position scale.
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Table 2.6: Perceived Congruence on Unmentioned Issues of the Senator with the Senator’s
Party
Abortion Government provision of services
Issue ownership cues
In-party ownership cues 0.09 0.17
(0.28) (0.26)
Out-party ownership cues -0.93* -0.60*
(0.29) (0.27)
Issue position cues
In-party ownership, 0.23 0.70*
congruent positions (0.28) (0.26)
Out-party ownership, -0.10 0.51*
congruent positions (0.29) (0.27)
In-party ownership, -1.63* -1.83*
incongruent positions (0.28) (0.26)
Out-party ownership, -1.45* -1.76*
incongruent positions (0.29) (0.27)
Intercept 1.43* 1.24*
(0.20) (0.19)
N 1,477 1,496
BIC 7,386.48 7,285.58
Note: cell entries are estimated coefficients generated using ordinary least
squares regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* = p ≤ .05 (one tailed)
abortion and government provision of services. These results are also largely consistent
with the expectations derived from my theory; only one coefficient — that generated for
the “out-party ownership, congruent positions” treatment — exhibits an unexpected sign
and it does not differ significantly (one tailed p ≤ .05) from zero. The dependent variables
here again range from least congruent (-5) to most congruent (5) with the Senator’s party
and the intercepts show that on average, the presence of the party labels in the control treat-
ment lead respondents to view the Senator as being 1.24 to 1.43 units more congruent with
his party in relation to the midpoint (0) of the measures.
As indicated by the first row of coefficients, the “in-party ownership cues” treatment on
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average leads participants to view the Senator as being more congruent with his party on
average than does the control treatment, but the effects do not differ significantly from zero
for either issue. The estimated coefficients for the “out-party ownership cues” treatment
in the second row of results are negative and differ from zero at a traditional level (p ≤
.05), indicating that this treatment leads people to view the Senator on average as holding
positions on these two unmentioned issues that are less congruent with his party. The effect
sizes for this treatment on participants’ views of the Senator’s congruence with his party on
abortion and government provision of services are 65% and 48% of the size of the effects
produced by the party cues embedded in the control treatment.16
The third and fourth rows of results show that the “in-party ownership, congruent po-
sitions” and “out-party ownership, congruent positions” treatments — those in which the
Senator talks about issues and takes positions that are associated with his party — do not
alter participants views of the degree to which he is congruent with his party on abortion.
They do, however, alter participants’ assessments of the Senator on government provision
of services. Relative to members of the control group, participants who received one these
treatments viewed the Senator as holding a position on this issue that was less congruent
with his party. The effect sizes of these treatments were 56% and 41% respectively the size
of the effect produced by the control treatment’s party cues.
The results in the fifth and sixth rows of Table 2.6 show that participants responded
to the “in-party ownership, incongruent positions” and “out-party ownership, incongruent
positions” treatments by assessing the Senator as being less congruent with his party on the
two unmentioned issues. All four estimated coefficients are negative and differ significantly
from zero. In addition, a comparison of these coefficients to the intercepts shows that the
size of each treatment’s effect is larger than that of the party cues embedded in the control
16| − 0.93/1.43| = .65 and | − 0.6/1.24| = .48. I am once more assuming that the effects of the party
labels in the control treatment are equivalent to the difference between the intercepts and the midpoint (0) of
the issue position scales.
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treatment.
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that citizens respond to the information cues
embedded in candidates’ messages by altering their views of candidates. Citizen respon-
siveness to issue ownership and issue position cues appear to be fairly consistent across
views of a candidate’s ideology, positions on the issues a candidate talks about, and even
positions on issues that a candidate does discuss even in the presence of powerful party
cues.
2.4.3 Partisan Lenses and Information Cues
As discussed previously, partisanship may moderate the degree to which in and out-
party partisans respond to issue ownership and issue positions cues. The expectation gen-
erated by this argument is that out-party partisans may discount or ignore cues communi-
cated to them by candidates because of a lack of shared partisanship between themselves
and the candidate. I test this notion by running the same sets of models as in the previous
section with a few modification. First, I exclude nonpartisans from these analysis so that I
only analyze the views of partisans.17 Second, I include a dummy variable in each model
indicating whether or not a participant identifies with the party of the fictional Senator.
Third, I interact this dummy variable with each of the dummies indicating whether or not
participants received a given experimental treatment.
This specification allows me to test the effect of each treatment on participants views of
the candidate for both in and out-party partisans. It also allows me to test the equivalency
of these treatment effects between partisan groups. To better communicate these results,
I report the marginal effect of each experimental treatment on in and out-party partisans
17Of the 1,312 respondents who answered the party identification question, 43% were Democrats, 45%
were Republicans, and the remaining 12% identified as independents. Independents and those who failed to
answer the partisanship questions were excluded from these analyses. The same basic pattern observed in the
results presented in the previous section are holds for this subsample of the data.
56
separately rather than presenting a convoluted table containing a large number of interac-
tion terms.18 In each of the following tables, an asterisk next to a marginal effect should
be interpreted as meaning that effect differs significantly from zero (one tailed p ≤ .05).
In other words, that treatment systematically influences the opinions of in or out-party par-
ticipants who received that treatment. A dagger indicates that a given treatment’s effect
differs significantly between in and out-party partisans. Note that the expected signs for
each marginal effect are the same as listed in table 2.3 above for the coefficients in the
direct effects models.
Table 2.7 contains the marginal effects of each experimental treatment on in and out-
party partisans’ views of the Senator’s ideology. These marginal effects and their associated
standard errors indicate both in and out-party participants’ views of the Senator’s ideology
were affected by issue ownership and position cues. In-party partisans responded in the
expected way to all of the treatments. Out-party partisans’ responded to four of the six in a
significant manner. The effects of the “in-party ownership cues” and “out-party ownership,
congruent positions” treatments failed to attain a standard level of statistical significance.
Note however that the effects of these two treatments do not differ significantly between
the two partisan groups. In fact, the only treatment in which the effects differ between in
and out-party partisans is for the “in-party ownership, incongruent positions” treatment.
Interestingly enough, out-party participants exhibited a stronger response to this treatment
as indicated by the two marginal effects than did in-party participants, a finding which is
counter intuitive.
I present the results of a similar set of analyses for each of the four issues the Senator
could have discussed in the experimental treatments in Table 2.8. These results are quite
similar to the direct effects of the treatments on the same issues discussed previously. The
18I report the raw table of results in Table 1 of the appendix. See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) on
the proper estimation of marginal effects and their associated standard errors in models including interaction
terms.
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Table 2.7: Partisanship and Ideological Perceptions
Out-party In-party
Issue ownership cues
In-party ownership cues 0.28 0.43*
(0.24) (0.25)
Out-party ownership cues -0.77* -0.92*
(0.24) (0.26)
Issue position cues
In-party ownership, 0.61* 0.94*
congruent positions (0.25) (0.25)
Out-party ownership, 0.24 0.65*
congruent positions (0.25) (0.25)
In-party ownership, -1.86*† -1.24*
incongruent positions (0.24) (0.24)
Out-party ownership, -2.04* -1.66*
incongruent positions (0.24) (0.26)
N 1,149
BIC 4,314.30
Note: cell entries are marginal effects generated
from the ordinary least squares regression reported
in Table 1 in the appendix. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses.
* = significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) treatment effect
relative to control
†= significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) difference in ef-
fect sizes for out and in-party partisans
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Table 2.8: Partisanship and Perceptions of Issue Positions: Mentioned Issues
Health Affirmative Taxes National
care action defense
Out In Out In Out In Out In
Issue ownership cues
In-party ownership cues 0.57 0.21 0.06 -0.19 -0.02 -0.14 0.41 0.14
(0.48) (0.51) (0.47) (0.51) (0.46) (0.49) (0.39) (0.41)
Out-party ownership cues -0.62 -1.25* -0.97* -0.82* -0.58 -0.93* -0.67* -0.87*
(0.49) (0.52) (0.48) (0.51) (0.47) (0.50) (0.39) (0.42)
Issue position cues
In-party ownership, 0.68* 0.99* 0.61 0.65* -0.01 0.34 0.21 0.39
congruent positions (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.40) (0.40)
Out-party ownership, 0.20 0.65* 0.36 1.17* 0.36 0.41 0.13 0.05
congruent positions (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.40) (0.40)
In-party ownership, -2.27* -1.65* -2.32* -1.38* -2.25* -2.07* -1.80* -1.66*
incongruent positions (0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.45) (0.47) (0.38) (0.40)
Out-party ownership, -1.68* -1.77* -2.14* -1.48* -2.08*† -0.93* -1.99* -1.83*
incongruent positions (0.49) (0.52) (0.48) (0.51) (0.46) (0.50) (0.39) (0.42)
N 1,120 1,120 1,117 1,112
BIC 5,767.32 5,734.60 5,650.57 5,236.54
Note: cell entries are marginal effects generated from the ordinary least squares regression reported in Table
1 in the appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* = significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) treatment effect relative to control
†= significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) difference in effect sizes for out and in-party partisans
first row of marginal effects suggests that the “in-party ownership cues” treatment fails
to inform participants’ views of the Senator on these issues. Five of the eight marginal
effects in the second row of results, those estimated for the “out-party ownership cues”
treatment, differ significantly from zero and exhibit the expected negative sign. Four of the
five significant effects are among in-party participants.
Twenty-one of the thirty two marginal effects of the issue position cue treatments differ
significantly from zero, another finding that is by and large consistent with those produced
when I model the unmoderated effects of the treatments on participants’ views of the can-
didates positions on these issues. Furthermore, all sixteen of marginal effects for issue
position cue treatments that contain incongruent positions differ significantly; both in and
out-party participants powerfully respond by altering their perceptions of the candidates’
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positions on these issues. Last, the only treatment effect that differs significantly between
in and out-party partisans is that of the “Out-party ownership, incongruent positions” treat-
ment in the model estimating participants’ views of the Senator’s position on taxation. In
this case, out-party participants once again exhibited a significantly stronger response to
the treatment than did in-party partisans.
The marginal effects of each experimental treatment on participants’ assessments of
the Senator’s positions on the two issues that were never discussed are shown in Table 2.9.
These results are also similar to the direct effects of the treatments previously explicated.
The “in-party ownership cues” treatment does not appear to affect in and out-party partici-
pants’ views. The ”out-party ownership cues” treatment, on the other hand, moves opinion
in a significant manner three out of four times in the expected direction.
As was the case in the direct effects model, only the two issue position cues treatments
which contained incongruent positions affected participants’ — both in and out-party —
views of the Senator’s positions on abortion. All of the issue position cue treatments ex-
hibited significant effects in the expected direction on participants’ views of the Senator’s
position on the provision of government services with one exception: the “out-party own-
ership, congruent positions” treatment failed to produce a statistically significant effect
among out-party participants. Finally, note that none of the marginal effects of the treat-
ments differed significantly between in and out-party partisans for either of these issues.
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that shared party identification between the Sen-
ator and participants failed to condition the effects of the treatments on participants’ views
of the Senator’s ideology and issue positions. Only two out of 42 tests of the equivalency of
the marginal effects produced by each treatment on in and out-party partisans’ assessments
of the Senator differed significantly from one another. In both cases, these differences were
contrary to my expectations. Rather than producing stronger responses among in-party par-
tisans, these two treatments stimulated a stronger response among out-party partisans. In
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Table 2.9: Partisanship and Perceptions of Issue Positions: Unmentioned Issues
Abortion Government services
Out In Out In
Issue ownership cues
In-party ownership cues 0.22 -0.06 0.10 0.02
(0.46) (0.52) (0.43) (0.46)
Out-party ownership cues -0.81* -1.38* -0.36 -1.01*
(0.46) (0.50) (0.44) (0.47)
Issue position cues
In-party ownership, 0.61 -0.49 0.69* 0.88*
congruent positions (0.48) (0.48) (0.45) (0.45)
Out-party ownership, -0.23 -0.36 0.22 0.65*
congruent positions (0.47) (0.48) (0.45) (0.45)
In-party ownership, -2.08* -1.68* -2.29* -1.50*
incongruent positions (0.45) (0.48) (0.43) (0.45)
Out-party ownership, -1.20* -1.52* -1.88* -1.52*
incongruent positions (0.46) (0.50) (0.44) (0.47)
N 1,099 1,111
BIC 5,534.36 5,486.84
Note: cell entries are marginal effects generated from the ordinary least
squares regression reported in Table 1 in the appendix. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
* = significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) treatment effect relative to control
†= significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) difference in effect sizes for out and
in-party partisans
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sum, shared party identification does not appear to have systematically influenced the way
that participants responded to my treatments.19
2.5 Conclusion
This research adds to our understanding of the process by which citizens form attitudes
about candidates during campaigns. Citizens use issue ownership and issue position cues
to form reasonable inferences about where candidates stand on the issues they discuss.
Citizens also use these cues to infer where candidates are positioned on issues that can-
didates do not talk about. Finally, citizens use these kinds of cues to make more general
assessments about the ideological dispositions of candidates.
The findings presented in this research lead to three implications. First, this research
demonstrates that citizens may be more politically aware than the classic findings on pub-
lic opinion suggest. Citizens appear to be able to sort through the information contained
within political messages and process relatively small and subtle bits of information — is-
sue ownership and issue position cues — in predictable ways. Citizens may not remember
precisely why they view candidates in a given way because they discard information once
they have updated their attitudes, but the impressions formed or altered by the discarded
information remain.
The second implication is related to candidates and the strategies they employ during
campaigns. Some candidates may find it advantageous to alter citizens’ views of their
ideological and issue positions in order to maximize their chance of electoral victory. For
example, a Democratic candidate running for office in a conservative district may improve
her chance of winning if she discusses Republican-owned issues and/or takes Republican
positions on issues, thus associating herself with the Republican Party and shifting citizens’
views of her away from the Democratic Party. Talking about Republican-owned issues
19It is possible that this is merely an artifact of my design. This experiment asks participants to assess a fic-
tional politician. Outside the laboratory, this process is dynamic rather than static and may be complicated by
the presence of preexisting attitudes about various real world political objects beyond the parties themselves.
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without outlining her positions may be an especially advantageous strategy because doing
so can alter citizens’ perceptions of her without tying her hands in the future on policy
outcomes or position taking should she win.
The third implication relates to the importance of issues in electoral politics more gen-
erally. These results suggest that issue ownership extends beyond simple issue advantage;
people associate some issues with parties and, in turn, those same issues with positions and
ideologies. In addition, citizens recognize these relationships and take them into account
when forming views of candidates. If citizens are able to recognize this connection, they
should also be able to infer from their views of candidates’ ideologies and issue positions
the kinds of policy outcomes they might observe should these same candidates win elected
office.
This research also leads to two points associated with how the presence of new issues
may affect the way citizens view candidates. First, issue ownership cues can only exist if a
party owns an issue, but many issues are not owned. Parties only come to own issues after
their performance over time reinforces the notion that they are better able to offer solutions
to problems related to those issues. This suggests that discussions of new issues cannot
contain ownership cues because no party could own them yet.20 Second, how do positions
on new issues become associated with parties? While it is possible that parties must consis-
tently take cohesive positions over time in order for citizens to associate positions on issues
with parties, it is also possible that citizens will infer that positions taken by Democratic
candidates are liberal while those taken by Republicans are conservative. In other words,
citizens may project the ideologies of the parties onto the positions their candidates take on
new issues. These important questions present potentially fruitful opportunities for future
research on this topic.
20A possible exception to this point is that candidates may try to frame new issues in terms of one or more
existing issue dimensions. Candidates may, for example, try to connect a new issue to preexisting salient
issues like national security or minority rights in order to create a frame that citizens may find more familiar.
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3 NEGATIVITY AND CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT
Campaigns are important components of democratic societies because they generate
information with which citizens can form attitudes and make decisions about candidates.
This information may be limited in scope because citizens tend to be both politically inat-
tentive and disinterested (Campbell et al. 1960). Despite these limitations, citizens still
have an accuracy motivation when making political decisions and thus tend to rely on cog-
nitive shortcuts. Candidates are aware of citizens’ limitations and thus create messages that
communicate cues that are both simple and meaningful to voters.
Candidates have many strategies they may consider using over the course of their cam-
paigns, one of the most important of which revolves around the tone of the messages they
adopt in their advertisements. Positive messages explicitly focus on the candidate herself:
her issue priorities, positions, personal characteristics, and record. Negative messages —
or attacks — explicitly focus on the opposing candidate: their shortcomings, unpopular
positions, poor record, inexperience, and character failings. Some recent research suggests
that citizens in the U.S. tend to view Democrats and Republicans as being “opposites” of
one another (Heit and Nicholson 2010), so these negative messages also imply that the
sponsor holds traits that are opposed to those attributed to the target. In this sense, negative
messages allow candidates to distinguish themselves from their opponents in a short and
easy to digest package.
I show in this research that negative messages contain two-way information cues —
cues that attribute a position to the target and imply that the sponsor holds an opposing
position. Two-way information cues should affect citizens’ views of the positions can-
didates hold on the issue discussed in an attack. Because parties and candidates tend to
present cohesive messages during and between campaigns (Carmines and Stimson 1989;
Layman and Carsey 2002), the effects of these cues should also extend both to issues that
are not mentioned and to assessments of candidates’ general ideological orientations. In
other words, if a candidate is attacked for holding a position on abortion that is liberal, she
should be viewed as being more liberal on abortion, other issues, and ideologically. Her
opponent, on the other hand, should be perceived as being more conservative on each of
these dimensions. Citizens’ views about both candidates, then, are shaped in response to
the information communicated by the cues.
The source of two-way information cues should also matter. Citizens who are exposed
to these cues should be more apt to accept and thus respond to negative messages spon-
sored by candidates with whom they share their partisan identities than with those with
whom they do not. Source cues in the form of shared partisanship between a citizen and a
candidate may inform citizens’ proclivities to respond to two-way information cues.
I test the effects of two-way information cues on citizens’ views of candidates using data
drawn from a survey experiment. I show that participants on average alter their ideological
assessments of both the target and sponsor of a message in response to two-way information
cues. I further show that respondents’ views of the candidates’ positions on issues — both
that are and, to a much lesser extent, are not discussed — are affected by these cues in
similar ways. Last, I find little evidence that source cues in the form of shared partisanship
between citizens and candidates conditions citizens’ degree of responsiveness to two-way
information cues. These results provide further evidence for the notion that citizens may
be able to respond to seemingly small bits of information to form views about politicians
despite expressing little interest in or knowledge about politics (see also Banda 2010).
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3.1 Campaigns and Attitude Formation
An engaged, informed, and attentive electorate is a key component in most understand-
ings of ideal representative democracies. While citizens are expected to hold these char-
acteristics, it has long been apparent that they are unwilling or unable to do so (Lazars-
feld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al.
1960). More recent work further suggests that citizens may not understand contemporary
political debates (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Because campaigns are salient and dy-
namic events, they may provide citizens with the opportunity to learn about candidates and
politics more generally. While scholars disagree about how powerful the effects of cam-
paigns on citizens may be, there is a general consensus that they matter in numerous ways
(Holbrook 1996; Carsey 2000; Wlezien and Erikson 2002; Stimson 2004; Hillygus and
Shields 2008; Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw 2008; Vavreck 2009).
Extant research suggests that citizens are able to process a number of different types
of information to form attitudes about politicians. Social cognition research suggests that
citizens often evaluate candidates by using a social taxonomy to categorize them, i.e. short-
cuts allowing for reductions in the inherent complexity of the political world (Kinder 1986;
Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuck 1986; Conover and Feldman 1989; Lodge, McGraw,
and Stroh 1989; Rahn et al. 1990). Party labels and other partisan cues provide voters with
informational shortcuts (Downs 1957), and knowledge about the partisanship of candidates
allows people to make cognitively useful inferences about them (Page 1978; Conover 1981;
Wright and Niemi 1983; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Hurwitz 1985; Granberg, Kas-
mer, and Nanneman 1988; Jacoby 1988; Riggle et al. 1992). Citizens may also use partisan
stereotypes to form evaluations of candidates (Rahn 1993), a notion that fits with the find-
ing that citizens associate certain issues with parties (Petrocik 1996; Egan Forthcoming).
Citizens in the U.S. tend to think about politics in terms of groups (Converse 1964), a fact
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that is likely reinforced by the tendency of American political parties to emphasize sig-
nificantly different agendas while in office (Page 1978; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
2002).
The extant literature has provided fewer answers to questions centering on the role that
negativity plays in the formation of citizens’ attitudes about candidates. Little research
examines the way in which information cues are processed by citizens based on the tone of
the message. In other words, to what extent and in what ways do negative messages convey
information to citizens about the messages’ targets and sponsors?
3.1.1 Negative Campaigning
Much of the literature on campaigns has focused on how they influence individual-
level behavior. Research within this subset of the literature has in large part focused on the
ways in which candidate contact (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994), candidate spending
(Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1990), and negative campaigning (Lau and Pomper
2004) affect turnout. This literature has produced mixed results. Early work suggests
that negativity depresses turnout because it leads people to think less of the candidates and
perhaps the electoral process more generally (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino
1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). More recent research suggests that negativity either
does not affect turnout (Clinton and Lapinski 2004) or that it encourages citizens to vote
(Finkel and Geer 1998; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Kahn and Kenney 2004; Geer 2006;
Geer and Lau 2006; Lau and Pomper 2004; Jackson and Carsey 2007, but see Krupnikov
2011).1
There are several possible explanations for this observed increase in participation. First,
1Kahn and Kenney (1999) argue that increasingly negative campaigns should stimulate turnout, but only
until the election environment becomes too saturated with negative information. If this happens, they posit
that turnout will decline.
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negative campaigns draw clear distinctions between the candidates (Carsey 2000) and re-
duce uncertainty about them (Alvarez 1997). Citizens tend to pay more attention to nega-
tive information than they do positive information (Kernell 1977; Lau 1982, 1985), negative
ads tend to be more memorable (Brians and Wattenberg 1996), and attacks may generate
stronger emotional responses — specifically of feelings of anxiety, concern, and fear —
among citizens (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Finkel and Geer 1998).
Research on negativity is beginning to move beyond questions of turnout and into other
forms of behavior like vote choice and to the study of political attitudes more generally
(see for example Franz and Ridout 2007; Ridout and Franz 2011). Most work on attitudes
examines the effects of negativity on candidate evaluation. Some studies show that negative
messages drive down evaluations of the targets (Merritt 1984; Kaid and Boydston 1987;
Basil, Schooler, and Reeves 1991; Kaid 1997; Pinkleton 1998) and sponsors (Merritt 1984;
Hill 1989; Martinez and Delegal 1990; Basil, Schooler, and Reeves 1991; Kaid, Chanslor,
and Hovind 1992; Lemert, Elliot, Bernstein, Rosenberg, and Nestvold 1991; Hitchon and
Chang 1995; Haddock and Zanna 1997; Hitchon, Chang, and Harris 1997; Pinkleton 1998)
of these message while others show that targets (Hill 1989; Martinez and Delegal 1990;
Lemert et al. 1991; Haddock and Zanna 1997) and sponsors (Kaid 1997) are viewed more
favorably. The findings in this literature, then, are decidedly mixed. Understanding the
ways in which negative messages influence citizens’ perceptions of candidates is key to
our understanding of democratic accountability (i.e. Geer 2006). I focus specifically on
how negative messages affect citizens’ views of candidates’ ideologies and issue positions.
3.2 Candidate Assessment and Negativity
Citizens tend to be cognitive misers who prefer to allocate their cognitive resources to
subject areas besides politics.2 In other words, citizens tend to be low-information voters
(Popkin 1994). Despite citizens’ general disinterest in politics, they still have an incentive
2See Fiske and Taylor (1991) for a general overview of cognitive miser theory.
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to make accurate judgements about politicians and policies (Kunda 1990) so that they can
make “correct” decisions when they vote (e.g. Lau and Redlawsk 1997; R. and Redlawsk
2006). This incentive drives citizens to make judgements about political objects in large
part by relying on heuristics like party labels.
While politicians tend to be more similar to other politicians who share their partisan-
ship than they are to those who do not, citizens are still aware that there is diversity within
parties.3 Understanding these differences may be key to the choices that citizens make
when deciding which candidate to support. Still, they want to collect adequate informa-
tion to make an accurate decision while minimizing the costs they face in exchange for
gathering this information.
This accuracy motivation along with citizens’ disinterest in politics encourages citizens
to rely on easily accessible cues when forming attitudes about candidates. Candidates’
messages, many of which citizens may be exposed to through television advertisements,
contain these kinds of cues. Citizens should be motivated to use candidates’ statements to
form attitudes about them.
Positive messages contain explicit information about the sponsoring candidate. The
explicit informational content of negative messages, on the other hand, is centered on the
target of the message. While some research has examined the impact of positive messages
on citizens’ views of the sponsoring candidate (e.g. Banda 2010), little work has focused
on the possible effects of negative messages on public opinion. Negative messages should
be particularly useful for citizens because they may allow citizens to form attitudes about
both the target of the message along with the sponsor.
Citizens should respond to negative messages by altering their views of the targeted
candidate. This process is relatively straightforward: the negative appeal contains new
information about the target of the message which citizens then use to update their attitudes
3Consider, for example, the ideological difference between Democratic Senators Ben Nelson and Eliza-
beth Warren and Republican Senators Olympia Snow and Ted Cruz.
69
about her. For example, a message may attack a candidate for being too liberal. Citizens
then process this information and update their opinions about the candidate, thus viewing
them as more liberal than they did before.4
Because of citizens’ motivation to draw as much as possible from small bits of infor-
mation, they should also make inferences about the sponsors of negative messages based
on the information conveyed in those messages about the target. Citizens should therefore
assess the sponsor of an attack in the opposite way that they do the target of that attack.
While citizens should respond to negative messages in this way during all types of cam-
paigns, this process may be magnified in general election campaigns because people in the
U.S. generally view Democrats and Republicans as being the opposites of one another (see
for example Heit and Nicholson 2010). Citizens’ views of the target of a message should
be pushed in one direction while their views of the sponsor should be pushed in the other
direction. In this sense, negative messages can be said to contain two-way information cues
— cues which contain information relevant to the assessment of both the targets and the
sponsors of such messages.5
3.2.1 Two-Way Information Cues and Candidate Assessment
Two-way information cues can be broken down into two different types of cues. First,
explicit cues refer to the information that should be attributed to the target of a negative
message. These are similar to the information cues embedded in positive messages; the
information should be attributed directly to the target of the message. In the case of positive
messages, the sponsor herself is the target while her opponent is the target of negative
messages. Second, implicit cues convey subtle information about the sponsor of a negative
4It is likely that partisanship plays a key role in determining the likelihood that citizens accept information
communicated by negative messages. I discuss this possibility later in this research.
5Positive messages also convey information about the candidate. They should not, however, inform citi-
zens’ views of the candidate’s opponent. This is because both the sponsor and the target of a positive message
are the same: the candidate herself. Given these limitations, citizens do not have a compelling reason to draw
inferences about one candidate after they have been exposed to a message sponsored by and about a different
candidate.
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message which suggest that the candidate is dissimilar to her opponent.
Citizens who are exposed to two-way information cues should update their views of
both the target and the sponsor of the message. For example, if Candidate A accuses
Candidate B of holding excessively liberal positions on an issue, citizens’ attitudes about
Candidate A and Candidate B should be affected in two different ways. First, the explicit
cue communicated by this message is that Candidate B is liberal. Citizens should respond
to this cue by assessing Candidate B as being more liberal than they might have had they
not been exposed to the negative message. Stated more formally:
H1: Candidates who are attacked for holding an extremely liberal (conser-
vative) issue position will be assessed as being more liberal (conservative)
ideologically than candidates who are not attacked.
The second way in which Candidate A’s message about Candidate B should matter is
by altering the views citizens hold about the former. Candidate A communicates additional
information to citizens about herself by attacking Candidate B for having liberal positions
on an issue. The implicit cue suggests that Candidate A is not like Candidate B, who is a
liberal candidate. In other words, the implicit cue implies that Candidate A is conservative.
Put more formally:
H2: Candidates who attack their opponents for holding an extremely liberal
(conservative) issue position will be assessed as being more conservative (lib-
eral) ideologically than candidates who do not attack.
Citizens evaluate candidates on dimensions beyond ideology; they also assess their
positions on issues. The way in which citizens respond to negative messages when form-
ing attitudes about issue positions should be similar to the process citizens go through
when forming attitudes about candidates ideologies. Attitudes about candidates’ ideolo-
gies, therefore, should extend to citizens’ views of the candidate’s issue positions. Using
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the earlier example of Candidate A’s attack on Candidate B, the explicit cue should lead
citizens to assess Candidate B as holding more liberal positions on the issues on which
Candidate A attacked them.
H3: Candidates who are attacked for holding an extremely liberal (conserva-
tive) issue position will be assessed as being more liberal (conservative) on
that issue than candidates who are not attacked.
The implicit cue should shift citizens’ assessments of the sponsoring candidate’s posi-
tions on the issues mentioned in the opposite direction. In other words:
H4: Candidates who attack their opponents for holding an extremely liberal
(conservative) issue position will be assessed as being more conservative (lib-
eral) on that issue than candidates who do not attack.
Candidates do not necessarily discuss all of the issues that may be of interest to citizens.
This can be due both to strategic behavior — candidates may wish to avoid certain issues or
those issues may not be salient — and to limited resources — candidates may lack the time
and money to explicate their positions on all issues. Despite little to no information about
the candidates’ positions on issues that are not discussed, citizens should still be able to
make reasonable inferences about these issue positions (see Banda 2010). When faced with
two-way information cues, citizens will use the information they have available to them to
generate assessments of candidates’ positions on issues that are not mentioned. In other
words, citizens should use explicit and implicit cues when assessing candidates’ positions
on unmentioned issues in the same ways they use them to assess candidates ideologies
and positions on the issues that were discussed. People tend to cluster issues together by
party or candidate, so a position on one issue may be correlated with a position on another
Layman and Carsey (e.g. 2002). Put in formal terms:
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H5: Candidates who are attacked for holding an extremely liberal (conserva-
tive) issue position will be assessed as being more liberal (conservative) on
other issues than candidates who are not attacked.
H6: Candidates who attack their opponents for holding an extremely liberal
(conservative) issue position will be assessed as being more conservative (lib-
eral) on other issues than candidates who do not attack.
3.2.2 Shared Partisanship as a Source Cue
Partisanship is a central concept that powerfully influences public opinion and mass
behavior in American politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Jacoby 1988; Rahn 1993). It is viewed
by many scholars as either a form of social identity (e.g. Huddy 2001; Green, Palmquist,
and Schickler 2002) or as a psychological attachment (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels
2002; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Many scholars in the former group argue that citizens tend
to categorize people as members of in and out-groups. In politics, citizens’ conceptions of
in and out-groups tend to center on partisanship (e.g. Huddy 2001; Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler 2002). Citizens thus identify themselves with copartisans while differentiating
themselves from people who are not copartisans (Tajfel 1982; Brewer 2007). Proponents
of this formulation of social identity theory posit that people experience strong biases that
favor in-groups relative to out-groups. Partisans are therefore more positively predisposed
towards members of their own parties than they are towards members of other parties.
This predisposition helps to satisfy partisans’ innate need for a positive social identity and
maintain the distinctiveness of members of a group (see Brewer 1991).
This perspective suggests that the likelihood that citizens respond to political infor-
mation should be affected by the way those citizens view the source of that information.
They should be more likely to accept - and thus be responsive to - information that origi-
nates from a source they view as credible than from a source they do not view as credible
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(Druckman 2001). In other words, citizens should be more likely to respond to informa-
tion cues embedded in candidates’ messages when citizens and candidates identify with the
same party relative to when they do not. Citizens who view the messages of a candidate
from the opposing party should discount the cue when forming an attitude and may go so
far as to ignore it entirely. The source of the information — i.e. the source cue — should
matter when citizens form or alter attitudes about candidates in response to the political
messages to which they are exposed. Put more formally:
H7: Citizens will be more responsive to two-way information cues when they
share the same partisanship with a candidate than they will when they do not.
The psychological perspective is less clear on the effects of partisanship on citizen re-
sponse to these kinds of source cues, but implies a different set of expectations. Citizens
may be Bayesian updaters who alter their views of political objects as they are exposed to
new information. Some research suggests that an observable gap may exist in public opin-
ion between partisan groups, but both groups still respond to new information in similar
ways even if the gap remains (Bartels 2002). In other words, party may condition the base-
line views that citizens hold towards candidates, but it should not influence the way they
respond to the information cues embedded in candidates’ messages. 6 This perspective,
then, predicts that citizens will respond to two-way information cues regardless of whether
or not they share their party identification with a given candidate. The previous perspective,
on the other hand, predicts that citizens who share their partisanship with candidates will
respond more powerfully to these cues than will citizens who do not.
6(Fiorina 1981) offers a third perspective on partisanship’s potential for conditioning citizen response to
candidates’ information cues. This perspective rests on the notion that partisanship is a cumulative tally of
a citizen’s previous evaluations of the political parties. This argument is similar to Bartels’ in that it allows
for differences in public opinion between Democrats and Republicans. However, this perspective leads to the
expectation that opinion among members of both parties converges over time as people update their views in
response to objective political information. “Objective information” is the key phrase here; if citizens do not
view information as credible, they have little reason to respond to it.
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3.3 Research Design
I designed a web-based survey experiment to test my theory of candidate assessment.
Participants were undergraduates recruited from an introductory political science course
at a large southeastern public university. While some scholars fear that nonrepresentative
samples in experimental research lead to findings that cannot be generalized, McDermott
(2002) argues that this is not always the case. Druckman and Kam (2011) extends this
research by convincingly showing that nonrepresentative samples pose a threat to gener-
alizeable results only if two conditions are met: heterogeneous treatment effects exist in
the population and there is little to no variance on the moderating variable in the sample.
Neither of these concerns are relevant to this research because my sample exhibits variance
in partisanship among participants: out of 417 participants, 222 identified as Democrats
while the remaining 195 identified as Republicans.7 Additionally, Barabas and Jerit (2010)
argue that the effects observed in a survey experiment may not translate to the popula-
tion as a whole because they are driven primarily by responses among members of certain
subgroups. The results that I describe should be interpreted as the effects of two-way infor-
mation cues on the views held by those citizens who might be exposed to similar political
messages in the real world, not necessarily on all citizens regardless of their proclivity to
become exposed to political information.
The survey instrument was administered online. Participants completed the experiment
at a time and place convenient to them during the collection period. Subjects first com-
pleted a pretest, part of which was devoted to collecting demographic information such as
ethnicity, partisanship, level of education, and ideological disposition. Participants were
also asked a series of political knowledge questions and were asked to rate their feelings
towards a number of individuals and groups.
7I omitted 30 participants from the analysis because they failed to identify with a political party. These
participants on average respond to the treatments in the ways predicted by my theory, but due to the limitations
of a sample of this size, the effects of two-way information cues are less consistent than they are among
partisans.
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Table 3.1: Treatment Assignment
Treatment N
Control treatment 99
Experimental treatments
Democrat attacks 116
Republican attacks 110
Both candidates attack 92
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, the cell
sizes for which are presented in Table 3.1.8 Each treatment was made up of four state-
ments attributed to two Senatorial candidates running for an open seat who were identified
as being a Democrat and a Republican.9 The partisanship of the candidates was explic-
itly identified in all treatments, including the control. In order to allow for a baseline for
comparison among the assessments made about the candidates by treatment, the control
treatment was made up of statements that did not contain references to issues or ideology.
These kinds of statements were noncontroversial and were designed to limit the transmis-
sion of political information to as great an extent as possible. The candidates did not talk
about issues and did not talk about their opponents. Instead, they talked about themselves.
I varied the target of the candidates’ statements in the remaining treatments. In the
treatments in which one or both candidates attacked, they did so on the basis of their op-
ponent’s positions on health care and taxes. When the Democrat attacked their Republican
opponent, they claimed that the latter held extremely conservative positions on the issues.
Similarly, when the Republican attacked the Democrat, he did so on the basis of his oppo-
nent’s extremely liberal positions on the issues.
8I report the full text of each treatment in the appendix.
9While the candidates were fictional, participants were not informed that this was the case until after the
posttest.
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I created three experimental treatments. In the first, the Democrat attacks the Repub-
lican while the latter avoided issues as in the control treatment. In the second, the Demo-
crat did not discuss issues while the Republican attacked him. In the final experimental
treatment, both candidates attacked each other. Comparing the effects of the experimental
treatments to those generated by the control will allow me to test the effects of two-way
informational cues on the formation of ideological and issue position assessments.
After reading the statements made by the Senators, participants were asked to assess
the ideologies and issue positions of the candidates. Ideology was coded from one to
seven, with one meaning “very liberal” and seven meaning “very conservative.” Issue
positions were measured on a one to eleven point scale with low values indicating very
strong Democratic positions and high values indicating staunch Republican positions.10 In
addition to questions asking participants to evaluate the positions of the candidates on the
two issues that they may have talked about — health care and taxes — subjects were also
asked to place the candidates on four issues that were never discussed: government aid
to blacks, defense spending, abortion, and government services. Including these issues in
the survey experiment allows me to test the degree to which citizens infer the positions
candidates hold on issues that are not discussed in response to two-way informational cues.
3.3.1 Model
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model participants’ assessments of the
candidates’ ideologies and positions on six issues — two of which could have been dis-
cussed in the treatments and four of which never were — as a function of three dummy
variables indicating whether or not each participant received one of the experimental treat-
ments reported in Table 3.1, a dummy variable indicating whether or not a given respondent
identified as a Democrat, and interactions between the Democratic identifier and each of
10See the appendix for question wordings.
77
the dummies for the experimental treatments.11 I estimate models for both candidates sep-
arately.12
3.3.2 Expectations
I expect to observe negative coefficients for each of the treatment indicators in the
models estimating participants’ views of the Democratic candidate’s ideology and issue
positions. This is because each of the experimental treatments should on average lead
participants to assess the Democrat as being more liberal or holding positions that are more
congruent with the Democratic Party relative to the control group regardless of whether
they are making an assessment on the basis of an explicit cue — as in the treatment in which
the Republican attacks the Democrat — or an implicit cue — as in the treatment in which
the Democrat attacks the Republican. I similarly expect to observe positive coefficients —
indicating that participants view the candidate as being more conservative and as holding
positions more congruent with the Republican Party — for all of the experimental treatment
indicators in each of my statistical models estimating participants’ ideological and issue
position assessments of the Republican candidate. Last, I expect to observe larger treatment
effects among participants whose partisanship is aligned with the source of a message. In
other words, I expect Democrats (Republicans) to respond more powerfully to both the
implicit and explicit cues embedded in an attack sponsored by a Democratic (Republican)
candidate than Republicans (Democrats).
11Though the dependent variable in the ideological evaluation model is ordinal rather than continuous, I
use OLS for two reasons. First, linear models with dummy variables are substantively equivalent to a series of
difference of means tests. Second, results generated by a linear model are easier to present in a straightforward
manner than are those from an ordered model. I replicated my analyses using ordered logistic regression and
found the same substantive results as the linear models I report below. I report these alternative specifications
in the appendix.
12I do not include any additional covariates in my models because I am only interested in the effects of
the treatments by partisanship. Participants where randomly assigned to a treatment, so the effects of other
controls should be orthogonal to those of the treatments.
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3.4 Results
I report the marginal effect of each experimental treatment on Democrats and Repub-
licans separately rather than presenting a convoluted table containing a large number of
interaction terms.13 I use the method described by (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006) to
estimate these marginal effects and standard errors. In each of the following tables, an
asterisk next to a marginal effect should be interpreted as meaning that effect differs sig-
nificantly from zero (one tailed p ≤ .05). In other words, that treatment systematically
influences the opinions of in or out-party participants who received that treatment. A dag-
ger indicates that a given treatment’s effect differs significantly between in and out-party
partisans.
3.4.1 Ideological Perceptions
I present the results of two models estimating participants’ ideological assessments
of the candidates in Table C.1.14 On the whole, these results suggest that participants
responded to two-way information cues in the ways predicted by my theory.
The first two columns of results show the effects of each experimental treatment on
Democrats’ and Republicans’ assessments of the Democratic candidate’s ideology. As ex-
pected, all of these marginal effects are negative, indicating that, on average, partisans of
both types who received an experimental treatment viewed the Democrat as being more lib-
eral than did those who were exposed to the control treatment. As shown by the marginal
effects reported in the first column, Democrats on average responded to all three of the
experimental treatments by viewing the Democratic candidate as being significantly (p ≤
.05) more liberal than did Democrats who received the control treatment. The second col-
umn of results shows that Republican citizens also respond to the treatments by viewing
13I report the raw results of each of my statistical models in the appendix.
14I report the results of identically specified ordered logistic regression models in the appendix. The results
of both sets of models are substantively identical.
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Table 3.2: Ideological Assessments
Candidate PID Democratic Republican
Participant PID D R D R
Democrat attacks -1.00* -1.06* 0.09 0.16
(0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19)
Republican attacks -0.39* -0.16 1.01* 1.11*
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20)
Both attack -1.03* -0.84* 0.80* 0.93*
(0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20)
BIC 1,206.45 1,240.72
N 414 413
Note: cell entries are marginal effects generated from
the ordinary least squares regression reported in Table 1
in the appendix. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses.
* = significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) treatment effect rela-
tive to control
†= significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) difference in effect
size between Democrats and Republicans
the Democrat as being more liberal, though the marginal effect for the “Republican at-
tacks” treatment do not differ significantly from the effect of the control treatment. These
effects are substantively meaningful: three of the five significant marginal effects average
about a full point on the seven point ideological scale and a fourth — Republican partici-
pants’ response to the “both attack” treatment — is greater than 0.8. None of the marginal
effects of the treatments on Democratic participants differed significantly from those for
Republicans.
The third and fourth columns of Table C.1 present the effects of the experimental treat-
ments on Democrats’ and Republicans’ views of the Republican candidate’s ideology. All
of the marginal effects are positive as expected, which indicates that participants on aver-
age perceived of the Republican as being more conservative when they were exposed to an
experimental treatment relative to when they were not. The “Democrat attacks” treatment,
however, failed to induce evaluations of the Republican candidate that were significantly
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different from those generated by the control treatment among both Democrats and Repub-
licans. Both Democrats and Republicans who received the “Republican attacks” treatment
viewed the Republican as being about one point on the seven point ideology scale more
conservative than did members of the control group. The “both attacks” treatment also in-
duced more conservative views of the Republican that approached a full point among both
partisan groups.
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that participants responded to two-way infor-
mation cues in the ways predicted by my theory. All four of the tests of implicit cues — the
“Democrat attacks” treatment for the Democratic candidate and the ”Republican attacks”
treatment for the Republican candidate — produced powerful and robust effects on partici-
pants’ views of the candidates’ ideological dispositions. Additionally, all four of the tests of
the treatment including attacks sponsored by both candidates also produced substantively
interesting effects in the expected direction. On the other hand, the evidence for the effec-
tiveness of explicit cues — the “Republican attacks” treatment for the Democrat and the
“Democrat attacks” treatment for the Republican candidate — appears to be limited; only
one of the four marginal effects produced by these cues differed significantly from zero.
3.4.2 Perceptions of Positions on Discussed Issues
Next, I report the effects of the experimental treatments on participants’ views of the
candidates’ positions on the two issues that were discussed: health insurance and taxes. The
marginal effects are shown in Table C.2.15 The effects of the treatments on participants’
assessments of the Democratic candidate are presented in the first four columns while those
of the Republican candidate are shown in the last four columns. ‘D’ and ‘R’ stand for
Democratic and Republican respondents respectively. These results are not as compelling
as those outlined in the previous section, but they are highly suggestive.
While three of the 24 marginal effects presented in the table exhibit an unexpected sign,
15The raw output of the regressions that generated these effects can be found in Table 2 in the appendix.
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Table 3.3: Perceived Positions on Mentioned Issues
Candidate PID Democratic Republican
Issue Health insurance Taxes Health insurance Taxes
Participant PID D R D R D R D R
Democrat attacks -0.93* -0.36 -1.12* -1.20* 0.29 -0.21 0.53 0.17
(0.56) (0.52) (0.56) (0.52) (0.54) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46)
Republican attacks -0.58 -0.16 -0.47 0.63 0.94* 1.46* 0.83* 0.69
(0.56) (0.53) (0.55) (0.52) (0.53) (0.50) (0.49) (0.46)
Both attack -0.99* -0.87 -0.54 -1.38* 0.95* 1.32* -0.04 0.24
(0.60) (0.54) (0.59) (0.53) (0.57) (0.51) (0.52) (0.47)
BIC 2,049.74 2,038.01 1,950.55 1,936.71
N 412 411 406 411
Note: cell entries are marginal effects generated from the ordinary least squares regression re-
ported in Table 1 in the appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* = significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) treatment effect relative to control
†= significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) difference in effect size between Democrats and Republicans
note that none of these three effects differs significantly from zero. For the most part, both
Democrats and Republicans who are exposed to one of the experimental treatments view
the Democratic candidate as holding positions that are more congruent with the Democratic
Party and the Republican candidate as holding positions that are more similar to those
espoused by the Republican Party.
Implicit cues again appear to carry greater weight than explicit cues when citizens ex-
press their views of the candidates’ positions on these issues. The “Democrat attacks”
treatment produces negative marginal effects — three of which differ significantly (p ≤
.05) from zero — among both types of partisans when participants report their percep-
tions of the Democratic candidate. Similarly, the “Republican attacks” treatment produces
positive marginal effects among both Democrats and Republicans when assessing the Re-
publican candidate’s positions on health insurance and taxes, three of which again differ
significantly from zero. Recall that the scale of the issue position variables runs from one
to eleven. The size of these marginal effects — many of which are greater than one unit —
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suggest that the treatments induce substantively meaningful shifts in the opinions partici-
pants hold about the candidates’ positions on these issues.
Participants, both Democrats and Republicans, appear to ignore the explicit cues em-
bedded in negative messages when reporting their views of the candidates’ positions on the
issues that were mentioned. Consider the marginal effects produced by the “Republican
attacks” treatment for the Democratic candidate and those estimated for the “Democrat at-
tacks” treatment for the Republican candidate. Six of the eight marginal effects have the
predicted sign, but none of them differ significantly from zero. These explicit cues, then,
do not appear to be very effective in shaping public opinion about the targets’ positions on
the issues that are discussed.
The “both attack” treatment generates marginal effects that exhibit the expected sign
seven out of eight times, but only half differ significantly from zero. The sizes of the
significant marginal effects range from about one unit to nearly 1.4, again substantively
meaningful effects on an eleven point scale. Given the apparent inability of explicit cues
to influence participants’ views of the candidates’ positions on these mentioned issues, it
may be the case that the implicit cues embedded within the “both attack” treatment is the
primary force driving these marginal effects.
Finally, note that as was the case in the analysis of participants’ views of the candi-
dates’ ideologies, none of the marginal effects generated by a given treatment differed sig-
nificantly between Democrats and Republicans. Shared partisanship, then, does not appear
to condition the degree to which participants’ responded to the treatments when forming
attitudes about the candidates’ positions on health insurance and taxes.
3.4.3 Perceptions of Positions on Unmentioned Issues
I present the results of my final set of analyses — those centering on participants’ views
of the candidates’ positions on issues that were not discussed in the treatments — in Tables
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Table 3.4: Perceived Positions of the Democratic Candidate on Unmentioned Issues
Affirmative National Government Abortion
action defense services
Participant PID D R D R D R D R
Democrat attacks -0.33 0.59 -0.07 -0.17 -1.16* -0.75* -0.50 -0.35
(0.50) (0.46) (0.48) (0.44) (0.47) (0.44) (0.48) (0.45)
Republican attacks -0.68† 0.87* -0.43 0.26 -1.13* -0.43 -0.92*† 0.39
(0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.45) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49) (0.45)
Both attack 0.13 0.10 -0.64 -0.34 -0.43 -0.86* -0.26 -0.29
(0.54) (0.47) (0.51) (0.45) (0.50) (0.46) (0.52) (0.46)
BIC 1,935.25 1,884.03 1,882.70 1,913.11
N 409 406 407 409
Note: cell entries are marginal effects generated from the ordinary least squares regression
reported in Table 1 in the appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* = significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) treatment effect relative to control
†= significant (p≤ .05 one tailed) difference in effect size between Democrats and Republicans
3.4 and 3.5.16 Two-way information cues do not appear to consistently inform citizens’
perceptions of the candidates’ positions on the unmentioned issues of affirmative action,
national defense, the provision of government services, or abortion. The effects of negative
messages that focus on some set of issues, then, may not extend to citizens’ opinions about
candidates’ positions on other issues. Given that participants were never exposed to any
information about these four issues, it should not be surprising that these results are weaker
than those of the previous analyses.
Table 3.4 contains the marginal effects generated by each of the experimental treatments
on the views participants expressed about the Democratic candidate’s positions on each of
the four unmentioned issues. Eighteen of the 24 marginal effects are negative as expected,
but few — just six — are statistically distinguishable from zero. Of these six, one exhibits
a positive rather than a negative sign: the “Republican attacks” treatment shifts Republican
participants’ views of the Democratic candidate’s position on affirmative action 0.87 units
towards congruence with the Republican Party. There does not appear to be a strong pattern
16The raw output of the regressions that generated these effects can be found in Table 3 in the appendix.
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Table 3.5: Perceived Positions of the Republican Candidate on Unmentioned Issues
Affirmative National Government Abortion
action defense services
Participant PID D R D R D R D R
Democrat attacks -0.23 -0.15 -0.34 0.43 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.60
(0.49) (0.45) (0.45) (0.42) (0.44) (0.41) (0.46) (0.43)
Republican attacks 0.90* 0.69 0.74* 0.39 0.29 0.55 0.90* -0.15
(0.49) (0.46) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41) (0.46) (0.44)
Both attack 0.24 0.68 0.28 0.63 0.33 0.67 -0.09 0.49
(0.52) (0.46) (0.48) (0.43) (0.47) (0.42) (0.49) (0.44)
BIC 1,935.25 1,884.03 1,882.70 1,913.11
N 409 406 407 409
Note: cell entries are marginal effects generated from the ordinary least squares regression
reported in Table 1 in the appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* = significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) treatment effect relative to control
†= significant (p ≤ .05 one tailed) difference in effect size between Democrats and Repub-
licans
among these results suggesting that any of the experimental treatments generated consistent
effects among Democrats’ and Republicans’ views of the Democratic candidate’s positions
on these issues.
Additionally, two pairs of marginal effects — both generated in response to the “Re-
publican attacks” treatment — among partisan groups differ significantly from one another:
those generated for the Democrat’s positions on affirmative action and abortion. Note that
in both cases Democratic participants responded by viewing the Democrat as holding po-
sitions more in line with the Democratic Party while Republicans viewed the candidate
as being more similar to the Republican Party, a finding that does not fit the expectations
generated by the theory put forth in this research.
I present an analysis of participants’ views of the Republican candidate’s positions on
four unmentioned issues in Table 3.5. These results are similarly inconsistent. Nineteen
of the 24 marginal effects are positive as expected, but only three differ significantly (p ≤
.05) from zero. All three significant marginal effects are observed among Democrats in
response to the “Republican attacks” treatment. In other words, Democratic participants
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responded to the implicit cue embedded in Republican-sponsored attacks and shifted their
view of the Republican to be increasingly congruent with the Republican Party on affir-
mative action, national defense, and abortion. The size of these effects ranged from nearly
0.75 to 0.9 unit increases, substantively meaningful shifts on an eleven point scale. None of
the marginal effects generated by the treatments differed significantly between Democratic
and Republican respondents.
To summarize, these results suggest that the effects of two-way information cues may
not extend from the issues candidates talk about to those they do not. I do, however, find
limited evidence that the implicit portion of these cues may stimulate participants to alter
their perceptions of candidates’ positions on unmentioned issues. That said, these effects
are not particularly consistent.
3.5 Conclusions
Taken as a whole, the results of this research suggest that citizens respond to the two-
way informational cues embedded in negative messages when forming attitudes about can-
didates contesting elections. In other words, the results of my analyses suggest that citizens
use the information about the target of an attack in negative campaign messages to inform
their attitudes about both the target of the attack and the message’s sponsor. This further
suggests that citizens respond to both explicit and implicit cues in negative messages.
These findings lead to an important implication about the formation of attitudes about
candidates. Despite being generally disinterested in, inattentive to, and having low lev-
els of knowledge about politics, citizens appear to be able to draw inferences about the
ideologies of the candidates they must choose between on election day. They do this in
part on the basis of exposure to the two-way information cues embedded within negative
campaign messages. Ideological location is key to theories of spatial voting; proximity the-
ories assume that the perceived distance between a citizen and candidates determines vote
choice (Downs 1957) while directional theory predicts that citizens support the candidate
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who sends the clearest signal that they are on the same side as a given citizen (Rabinowitz
and Macdonald 1989). Ideological location matters for both theories, though in different
ways. Negative messages inform citizens’ perceptions of where the candidates are located
in ideological space and this knowledge allows citizens to make better informed choices.
Another implication of this research speaks to the negative advertising and mobilization
literature. The results I present in this research suggest that negative messages on average
contain more information than do positive messages, at least in the sense that citizens can
learn about both the target and the sponsor of an attack from these messages. Scholars who
argue that negative campaigns provide more information than do predominantly positive
campaigns (e.g. Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004) appear to be correct; negative mes-
sages tell citizens about both candidates while positive messages only provide individuals
with information about the sponsoring candidate. The additional information provided to
voters by negative messages may in part explain the increase in turnout that appears to
correspond with increasingly negative campaigns.
This research also produces four implications about candidate behavior. First, candi-
dates may be able to influence citizens’ views about their opponent by utilizing negative
messages. By defining their opponents as holding positions outside of the mainstream of
American politics, candidates can induce citizens to alter their perceptions of their oppo-
nents in a way that may be advantageous. If a candidate successfully frames their opponent
as being ideologically extreme or as holding extremist positions on issues, they may be able
to reduce their opponent’s electoral support, strengthen support for their own candidacy, or
some combination of the two. All of these possible outcomes increase the likelihood of
victory for the attacking candidate.
The second implication is related to my finding that citizens’ ideological and issue po-
sition assessments of candidates are responsive to implicit cues. Candidates want to control
the campaign information environment. They can attempt to exert control by defining the
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way that citizens view both themselves and their opponent. Because the primary way that
candidates communicate with voters is through television advertisements and they have
limited resources, it is reasonable for candidates to attempt to define both themselves and
their opponents simultaneously.
The third implication is that candidates may use negative rather than positive mes-
sages in order to alter public opinion about themselves because citizens tend to give greater
weight to negative information (Kernell 1977; Lau 1982, 1985) and negative messages may
lead to strong emotional responses among voters (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Finkel and
Geer 1998). In this sense, negative message may be more valuable — offering candidates
more “bang for their buck” — for candidates than positive messages because they are more
likely to draw the attention of citizens and more likely to affect their views. Positive mes-
sages may be less effective in this way.
The final implication for the behavior of candidates is that candidates may be able to al-
ter citizens’ views of their positions on issues that they do not want to address. A candidate
may, for example, hold a position that is unpopular with members of her party. Rather than
remind her supporters that she holds an unpopular position that is more congruent with the
opposing party than her own, she may instead opt to attack her opponent on other issues.
Given the finding that implicit cues can be effective in shifting citizens’ assessments of can-
didates’ positions on issues they do not discuss, it is possible that candidates may be able
to alter citizens’ views on their own positions on these issues without directly engaging the
issues at all.
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A APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Additional Analysis from Chapter 1
While the total effects presented in Figure 2 of the paper are the main quantities of
interest generated by my model, scholars should also be interested in how the endogenous
covariates affect the outcome variables over time. I plot the distributed lag effects gen-
erated by my model for Democratic and Republican candidates in both noncompetitive
and competitive elections in Figure A.1 of this appendix.1 The plots show the effects of
a one standard deviation increase in the number of party-owned advertisements run by a
candidate’s opponent on the candidate’s advertising behavior across a five week period in
both noncompetitive and competitive campaign environments. The figure shows that the
preponderance of candidates’ responsive behavior to the advertising strategies of their op-
ponents occurs contemporaneously, i.e. in the same week in which the change occurs —
time t. While candidates’ advertising strategy appears to shift to some degree in future
weeks, these effects are for the most part quite small compared to the contemporaneous
effect.
The left column of plots in Figure A.1 shows the effects of the opposing candidate’s ad-
vertising strategy on Democratic candidates’ Democratic-owned issue agendas. The top left
panel shows that a one standard deviation increase in the number of advertisements aired by
a Republican candidate mentioning Democratic-owned issues in a noncompetitive election
leads Democratic candidates on average to immediately (time t) air about 37 additional
ads that mention issues associated with the Democratic Party. In competitive elections,
this contemporaneous effect is an increase of about 39 ads. In future weeks, Democrats in
both competitive and noncompetitive candidates decrease the number of airings of adver-
tisements mentioning Democratic-owned issues, but by small amounts.2 The bottom left
1See DeBoef and Keele (2008) for more on how to generate distributed lags effects.
2In noncompetitive elections, Democrats air 0.67, 0.37, 0.21, and 0.11 fewer advertisements in the fol-
lowing four weeks in response to the initial change in their opponents’ advertising behavior. In competitive
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Note: The effects plotted here are generated by one standard deviation increases of a candidate’s opponent’s
party-owned issue emphasis.
Figure A.1: Distributed Effects of Candidates’ Volume of Party-Owned Issue Ads on the
Advertising Behavior of their Opponents
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panel shows that a one standard deviation unit increase in the number of airings mentioning
Republican-owned issues by Republican candidates on average leads Democrats to air 25
more ads in noncompetitive and 42 more advertisements in competitive elections in time
t. In the following weeks (times t + 1 through t + 4), the Democrat airs on average 5.4,
2.6, 1.2, and 0.6 more ads in noncompetitive campaigns and 6, 2.8, 1.4, and 0.7 more ads
in competitive campaigns.
The top right panel of Figure A.1 shows that a one standard deviation unit increase in
the number of ads mentioning Democratic-owned issues aired by Democratic candidates
on average leads Republicans to air an additional 40.8 ads in noncompetitive elections and
37.3 more ads in competitive elections in the week during which the change occurs (time
t). While this may seem at odds with the findings presented in Figure 2, a closer look at the
effects over the following four weeks shows that this is not the case — because Republicans
in noncompetitive elections reduce the number of ads they air mentioning Democratic-
owned issues over future time weeks than do Republicans in competitive elections. In
noncompetitive elections, Republican candidates run 6.8, 3.7, 2, add 1.1 fewer ads in each
of the next four weeks. Republicans in competitive environments, on the other hand, air
3.3, 1.8, 1, and 0.5 fewer ads during the following four weeks.
Finally, the bottom right panel of Figure A.1 shows that the advertising behavior of
Republican candidates is responsive to that of their Democratic opponents on Republican-
owned issues. A one standard deviation increase in the number of advertisements aired by
Democrats focused on Republican-owned issues on average leads Republicans to air 31.4
and 45 more ads mentioning the same set of issues immediately in noncompetitive and
competitive campaigns respectively. In noncompetitive campaigns, Republicans continue
to respond over future weeks to this behavior by running more ads mentioning issues as-
sociated with the Republican Party — 2, 1, 0.5, and 0.2 additional advertisements in each
elections, these values are estimated to be 0.43, 0.24, 0.13, and 0.07 fewer ads aired in each of the next four
weeks.
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of the next four weeks. Republicans in competitive elections, on the other hand, run fewer
advertisements about Republican-owned issues over the course of the following weeks —
0.8, 0.4, 0.2, and 0.1 fewer ads in each week.
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B APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Experimental Design
Participants read the following block of text before being exposed to one of the follow-
ing treatments:
We would like you reaction to some comments made at a recent re-election
campaign appearance by a Senator from a different state, [Democratic/Republican]
Senator Franklin, who said:
• Control group
– Franklin is identified as either a Democrat or a Republican
∗ “America is the greatest country in the world, and I intend to keep it that
way. Send me back to Washington so I can keep fighting for you and our
families. I have been a successful leader for my entire life, and I will con-
tinue to be a leader in the United States Senate well into the next decade.”
• In-party ownership cues
– Franklin is identified as a Democrat
∗ “Affirmative action is an important issue in this campaign. I will be de-
voting a great deal of attention to it in the coming months. Health care is
also high on my agenda. I can assure you that I will devote a great deal of
attention to this issue in the future as well.”
– Franklin is identified as a Republican
∗ “We have serious problems with our system of taxation in this country. I
know that this is a key issue in the minds of many in this great state and
I want you all to know that I will make fixing these problems a priority.
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Also, nothing is more important to me than national security. The safety of
American citizens is always at the forefront of my mind.”
• Out-party ownership cues
– Franklin is identified as a Democrat
∗ “We have serious problems with our system of taxation in this country. I
know that this is a key issue in the minds of many in this great state and
I want you all to know that I will make fixing these problems a priority.
Also, nothing is more important to me than national security. The safety of
American citizens is always at the forefront of my mind.”
– Franklin is identified as a Republican
∗ “Affirmative action is an important issue in this campaign. I will be de-
voting a great deal of attention to it in the coming months. Health care is
also high on my agenda. I can assure you that I will devote a great deal of
attention to this issue in the future as well.”
• In-party ownership, congruent positions
– Franklin is identified as a Democrat
∗ “Affirmative action is an important issue in this campaign. The govern-
ment must ensure that affirmative action policies are enforced so that we
may continue to redress the problems caused by slavery and racism during
America’s past. Healthcare is also high on my agenda. I can assure you
that I will introduce and support legislation seeking to ensure that all Amer-
icans are provided adequate medial care through a public option regardless
of their financial situations.”
– Franklin is identified as a Republican
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∗ “We have serious problems with our system of taxation in this country.
Our system is complicated and our tax rates are far too high. I will make
reducing the burden of taxes on all Americans and simplifying our tax code
my priorities. Also, nothing is more important to me than national security.
Because the safety of American citizens is always at the forefront of my
mind, I will continue to support a strong and well funded military capable
of defending us from foreign threats.”
• Out-party ownership, congruent positions
– Franklin is identified as a Democrat
∗ “We have serious problems with our system of taxation in this country. Our
system is complicated and our tax rates for the rich are far too low. I will
make reducing the burden of taxes on ordinary Americans and simplifying
our tax code my priorities. Also, nothing is more important to me that
national security. Because the safety of American citizens is always at the
forefront of my mind, I will press for a greater diplomatic engagement with
the international community. Some of the military’s budget could be better
spent in other ways.”
– Franklin is identified as a Republican
∗ “Affirmative action is an important issue in this campaign. The government
must end these policies as they have long since become unfair. Health care
is also high on my agenda. I can assure you that I will introduce and support
legislation seeking to protect our current system of privatized health care.
Competition is key and a government sponsored health care system would
interfere with the private market.”
• In-party ownership, incongruent positions
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– Franklin is identified as a Democrat
∗ “Affirmative action is an important issue in this campaign. The government
must end these policies as they have long since become unfair. Health care
is also high on my agenda. I can assure you that I will introduce and support
legislation seeking to protect our current system of privatized health care.
Competition is key and a government sponsored health care system would
interfere with the private market.”
– Franklin is identified as a Republican
∗ “We have serious problems with our system of taxation in this country. Our
system is complicated and our tax rates for the rich are far too low. I will
make reducing the burden of taxes on ordinary Americans and simplifying
our tax code my priorities. Also, nothing is more important to me that
national security. Because the safety of American citizens is always at the
forefront of my mind, I will press for a greater diplomatic engagement with
the international community. Some of the military’s budget could be better
spent in other ways.”
• Out-party ownership, incongruent positions
– Franklin is identified as a Democrat
∗ “We have serious problems with our system of taxation in this country.
Our system is complicated and our tax rates are far too high. I will make
reducing the burden of taxes on all Americans and simplifying our tax code
my priorities. Also, nothing is more important to me than national security.
Because the safety of American citizens is always at the forefront of my
mind, I will continue to support a strong and well funded military capable
of defending us from foreign threats.”
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– Franklin is identified as a Republican
∗ “Affirmative action is an important issue in this campaign. The govern-
ment must ensure that affirmative action policies are enforced so that we
may continue to redress the problems caused by slavery and racism during
America’s past. Healthcare is also high on my agenda. I can assure you
that I will introduce and support legislation seeking to ensure that all Amer-
icans are provided adequate medial care through a public option regardless
of their financial situations.”
Participants were then asked the following questions and were tasked with placing Sen-
ator Franklin using a ruler widget:
• Where would you place [Democratic/Republican] Senator Franklin’s political ideol-
ogy on the following scale?
– Response: a ruler widget with the following labels equally spaced: Very Lib-
eral, Liberal, Somewhat Liberal, Moderate, Somewhat Conservative, Conser-
vative, Very Conservative.
• Using the following scale where the one end means “the government should provide
health insurance to all citizens including a public option” and the other end means
“health insurance should be provided through the private sector,” where would you
place [Democratic/Republican] Senator Franklin on health care reform?
– Response: a ruler widget with the lower end of the scale labeled “Govt. provi-
sion of insurance” and the higher end of the scale labeled “Private provision of
insurance.”
• Using the following scale where one ends means “the government should help blacks”
and the other end means “blacks should help themselves,” where would you place
[Democratic/Republican] Senator Franklin on the issue of aid to blacks?
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– Response: a ruler widget with the lower end of the scale labeled “Govt. help
blacks” and the higher end of the scale labeled “blacks help themselves.”
• Using the following scale where one ends means “taxes on the wealthy should be
greatly increased” and the other end means “taxes on the wealthy should be greatly
decreased,” where would you place [Democratic/Republican] Senator Franklin on
the issue of taxing the wealthy?
– Response: a ruler widget with the lower end of the scale labeled “Greatly In-
crease Taxes on Rich” and the higher end of the scale labeled “Greatly Reduce
Taxes on Rich.”
• Using the following scale where one end means “defense spending should be greatly
decreased” and the other end means “defense spending should be greatly increased,”
where would you place [Democratic/Republican] Senator Franklin on the issue of
defense spending?
– Response: a ruler widget with the lower end of the scale labeled “greatly de-
crease defense spending” and the higher end of the scale labeled “greatly in-
crease defense spending.”
• Using the following scale where one end means “the government should provide
many more services” and the other end means “the government should provide many
fewer services,” where would you place [Democratic/Republican] Senator Franklin
on the issue of government services?
– Response: a ruler widget with the lower end of the scale labeled “provide many
more services” and the higher end labeled “provide many fewer services.”
• Using the following scale where one end means “by law, a woman should always
be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice” and the other end
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means “by law, abortion should never be permitted,” where would you place [Demo-
cratic/Republican] Senator Franklin on the issue of abortion?
– Response: a ruler widget with the lower end of the scale labeled “by law, abor-
tion available by choice” and the higher end labeled “by law, abortion never
permitted.”
• Please rate [Democratic/Republican] Senator Franklin using what we call a feeling
thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 mean that you feel favorable and warm
toward Senator Franklin. Ratings between 0 and 50 mean you feel unfavorable and
cool toward Senator Franklin.
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C APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Treatments and Questions
The text of the treatments and questions is presented below exactly as participants in
the pilot study saw them. Participants first saw the following text:
We are going to show you a number of statements made by two candidates
running for an open Senate seat during their recent election campaigns. Steve
Franklin is a Democrat and Jeff Perkins is a Republican. Please read the state-
ments on the following page carefully. When you are finished, please move on
to the next section.
They were then randomly assigned with equal probability to one of the four treatment
groups, after which they were be exposed to the text of their treatment. The text of each
treatment follows:
C.1.1 Control treatment
• Democratic candidate Steve Franklin
– “America is the greatest country in the world, and I intend to keep it that way.
Send me back to Washington so I can keep fighting for you and our families.”
– “My record of public service is second to none. I have served this great state
for many years and, with your blessing, will continue to uphold our ideals in
Washington.”
• Republican candidate Jeff Perkins
– “I’m on your side and always have been. I have and will continue to fight
against special interests and Washington’s culture of corruption and incompe-
tence.”
– “I have been a successful leader for my entire life and I will continue to be a
leader in the United States Senate well into the next decade.”
C.1.2 Treatment A: Democrat attacks, Republican does not
• Democratic candidate Steve Franklin
– “My opponent doesn’t want you to notice his record on health care. He talks a
lot about fostering competition, but what he really wants to do is eliminate all
federal funding for Medicare and Medicaid. He may not come out and say it
like that, but it’s one of his goals.”
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– “Jeff Perkins would have you believe that he wants to cut taxes for all of you.
Nothing could be further from the truth; he only wants to cut taxes for corpora-
tions and the richest one percent of the country. That won’t stimulate economic
growth; it’ll just make the rich richer.”
• Republican candidate Jeff Perkins
– “I’m on your side and always have been. I have and will continue to fight
against special interests and Washington’s culture of corruption and incompe-
tence.”
– “I have been a successful leader for my entire life and I will continue to be a
leader in the United States Senate well into the next decade.”
C.1.3 Treatment B: Republican attacks, Democrat does not
• Democratic candidate Steve Franklin
– “America is the greatest country in the world, and I intend to keep it that way.
Send me back to Washington so I can keep fighting for you and our families.”
– “My record of public service is second to none. I have served this great state
for many years and, with your blessing, will continue to uphold our ideals in
Washington.”
• Republican candidate Jeff Perkins
– “Ladies and gentlemen, my opponent talks a good game about providing health
care to everyone, but he skips over all of the most important parts of his plan.
He’s doesn’t want to tell you that he supports an expensive and wasteful federal
takeover of our health care system.”
– “If you look at his record, you’ll see that Steve Franklin always supports raising
your taxes, not just for the rich but for everyone! He doesn’t think you know
what to do with your money. He thinks the government knows how to spend
it better than you do. He wants to take your hard earned money and give it to
other people.”
C.1.4 Treatment C: Both candidates attack
• Democratic candidate Steve Franklin
– “My opponent doesn’t want you to notice his record on health care. He talks a
lot about fostering competition, but what he really wants to do is eliminate all
federal funding for Medicare and Medicaid. He may not come out and say it
like that, but it’s one of his goals.”
– “Jeff Perkins would have you believe that he wants to cut taxes for all of you.
Nothing could be further from the truth; he only wants to cut taxes for corpora-
tions and the richest one percent of the country. That won’t stimulate economic
growth; it’ll just make the rich richer.”
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• Republican candidate Jeff Perkins
– “Ladies and gentlemen, my opponent talks a good game about providing health
care to everyone, but he skips over all of the most important parts of his plan.
He’s doesn’t want to tell you that he supports an expensive and wasteful federal
takeover of our health care system.”
– “If you look at his record, you’ll see that Steve Franklin always supports raising
your taxes, not just for the rich but for everyone! He doesn’t think you know
what to do with your money. He thinks the government knows how to spend
it better than you do. He wants to take your hard earned money and give it to
other people.”
After participants finished reading their treatment, they were asked fourteen questions.
First they were asked to assess each candidate’s ideology and then their positions on six
different political issues. The text and for the former were as follows:
Question 1 and 2: Where would you place [Democratic candidate Steve Franklin’s/Republican
candidate Jeff Perkins’] political ideology on the following scale?
Very liberal
Liberal
Somewhat liberal
Moderate
Somewhat conservative
Conservative
Very conservative
There were eleven possible responses to each of the issue position questions, each of
which were labeled numerically from 1 through 11. The text of the questions were as
follows:
Questions 3 and 4: On a scale of one to eleven, with one meaning the gov-
ernment should provide health insurance to all citizens and eleven meaning the
government should ensure that health care is available to its citizens through
private insurers, where would you place [Democratic candidate Steve Franklin/Republican
candidate Jeff Franklin] on the issue of health care reform?
Questions 5 and 6: On a scale of one to eleven, with one meaning the govern-
ment should help blacks and eleven meaning blacks should help themselves,
where would you place [Democratic candidate Steve Franklin/Republican can-
didate Jeff Franklin] on the issue of aid to blacks?
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Questions 7 and 8: On a scale of one to eleven, with one meaning taxes on the
wealthy should be greatly increased and eleven meaning taxes on the wealthy
should be greatly decreased, where would you place [Democratic candidate
Steve Franklin/Republican candidate Jeff Franklin] on the issue of taxation of
the wealthy?
Questions 9 and 10: On a scale of one to eleven, with one meaning defense
spending should be greatly decreased and eleven meaning defense spending
should be greatly increased, where would you place [Democratic candidate
Steve Franklin/Republican candidate Jeff Franklin] on the issue of defense
spending?
Questions 11 and 12: On a scale of one to eleven, with one meaning the gov-
ernment should provide many more services and eleven meaning the govern-
ment should provide many fewer services, where would you place [Democratic
candidate Steve Franklin/Republican candidate Jeff Franklin] on the issue of
government services?
Questions 13 and 14: On a scale of one to eleven, with one meaning by law,
a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal
choice and eleven meaning by law, abortion should never be permitted, where
would you place [Democratic candidate Steve Franklin/Republican candidate
Jeff Franklin] on the issue of abortion?
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Table C.1: Ideological Assessments
Democratic candidate Republican candidate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democrat attacks -1.05* -2.06* -1.01* -2.16* 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.24
(0.13) (0.26) (0.20) (0.40) (0.14) (0.24) (0.21) (0.35)
Democrat attacks -0.05 0.15 0.03 0.02
X Democratic PID (0.27) (0.52) (0.28) (0.49)
Republican attacks -0.32* -0.67* -0.40* -0.74* 1.07* 2.13* 1.05* 2.06*
(0.13) (0.24) (0.20) (0.37) (0.14) (0.27) (0.21) (0.38)
Republican attacks 0.23 0.26 0.05 0.32
X Democratic PID (0.27) (0.50) (0.28) (0.52)
Both attack -0.95* -1.92* -1.04* -2.08* 0.87* 1.66* 0.84* 1.62*
(0.14) (0.27) (0.21) (0.41) (0.15) (0.27) (0.22) (0.40)
Both attack 0.19 0.29 0.09 0.24
X Democratic PID (0.28) (0.54) (0.30) (0.54)
Democratic PID -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.04
(0.20) (0.36) (0.21) (0.36)
Intercept 3.33* 3.30* 4.87* 4.89*
(0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15)
Cutpoint 1-2 -3.96* -4.01* -5.47* -3.13*
(0.27) (0.34) (1.01) (0.41)
Cutpoint 2-3 -1.26* -1.19* -3.15* -2.36*
(0.19) (0.28) (0.35) (0.33)
Cutpoint 3-4 0.32† 0.39 -2.27* -0.54*
(0.18) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27)
Cutpoint 4-5 1.80* 1.84* -0.53* 0.79*
(0.22) (0.31) (0.18) (0.27)
Cutpoint 5-6 3.19* 3.12* 0.77* 3.22*
(0.38) (0.43) (0.19) (0.32)
Cutpoint 6-7 3.10*
(0.24)
BIC 1272.14 1234.20 1204.64 1161.00 1328.53 1275.50 1240.09 1181.22
N 446 446 416 416 445 445 415 415
Note: Estimated OLS and ordered logit coefficients are reported along with standard errors in parentheses.
† = p ≤ .1 and * = p ≤ .05 (two tailed)
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Table C.2: Assessments of the Candidates’ Positions on Mentioned Issues
Democrat Republican
Health insurance Taxes Health insurance Taxes
Democrat attacks -0.98† -1.17* 0.38 0.56
(0.55) (0.55) (0.53) (0.48)
Democrat attacks 0.63 -0.03 -0.59 -0.38
X Democratic PID (0.75) (0.75) (0.72) (0.66)
Republican attacks -0.63 -0.52 1.03* 0.85†
(0.55) (0.54) (0.52) (0.48)
Republican attacks 0.47 1.16 0.43 -0.17
X Democratic PID (0.76) (0.75) (0.72) (0.67)
Both attack -1.04† -0.60 1.03† -0.01
(0.59) (0.59) (0.56) (0.52)
Both attack 0.18 -0.79 0.28 0.25
X Democratic PID (0.80) (0.79) (0.76) (0.70)
Democratic PID 0.02 -0.17 0.01 0.91†
(0.55) (0.55) (0.52) (0.48)
Intercept 4.87* 4.30* 7.25* 7.11*
(0.41) (0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
BIC 2051.80 2040.16 1953.07 1938.11
N 414.00 413.00 405.00 413.00
Note: Estimated OLS coefficients are reported along with standard errors in paren-
theses.
* = p ≤ .05 (two tailed)
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